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l.

INTRODUCTION

Promulgated in 1987 by the American Law Institute (A.L.I.)
and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (N.C.C.U.S.L.), Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.) is the first comprehensive statutory formulation of personal property leasing law. In the best · tradition of the
Restatements and the U.C.C., Article 2A does not create personal
property leasing law, but rather codifies the better common law
practices in this rapidly expanding area of commercial law. The
drafters of Article 2A endeavored to codify the legal treatment of
personal property leases in much the same way that Articles 2 and
9 of the U.C.C. preemptively govern sales and secured transactions,
respectively. While the scope of this new Article is expansive, consistent with its statutory analogue adopted from Article 2, 1 the
1. The drafters of Uniform Article 2A note that:

The lease is closer in spirit and form to the sale of goods than to the creation of a
security interest. While parties to a lease are sometimes represented by counsel and
their agreement is often reduced to a writing, the obligations of the parties are bilat-
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drafters specifically focused upon recurring, and important leasing
issues.2
The Lease Article also continues the commercial law's vindication of freedom of contract principles, assuring that the parties to
a lease transaction may, for the most part, tailor the lease to the
exigencies of their particular circumstances.3 In addition, as with
other U.C.C. Articles, the design of uniform Article 2A affords the
states considerable flexibility in tailoring the uniform provisions to
their existing state laws. For this reason, an understanding of Alabama case law that falls within Article 2A's ambit is crucial to the
formulation of a proposed version of Article 2A for Alabama.
Adoption of Article 2A has not been widespread. Currently,
only nine states have enacted the lease statute. 4 But, support for
Article 2A is increasing, 5 and eventual adoption by a majority of
states can reasonably be expected.6
eral and'the common law of leasfug is dominated by the need to preserve freedom of
contract. Thus the drafting committee concluded that Article 2 was the appropriate ·
statutory analogue.
U.C.C. § 2A-101 comment (1990). [Editor's note: citations to revised Article 2A are identified at the 1990 edition; citations to former Article 2A and to other Articles of the Uniform
Commerical Code are identified as the 1989 edition.]
2. Article 2A is divided into five substantive parts: (1) "General Provisions" (2A-100s);
(2) "Formation and Construction of Lease Contract" (2A-200s); (3) "Effect of Lease Contract" (2A-300s); (4) "Performance of Lease Contract" (2A-400s); and (5) "Default" (2A500s). The new Article speaks to issues such as the formation (see §§ 2A-204 to -206), construction (see § 2A-207) and modification of leases (see § 2A-208); express and implied
warranties (see §§ 2A-210 to -216); third-party interests and rights under leases (see § 2A~
216); priority of leasing interests (see §§ 2A-306 ~ -307); repu~iation, substituted and excused performance (see §§ 2A-401 to -407); rights and remedies when the lessor or lessee
defaults (see §§ 2A-508 to -531); statute of frauds (see § 2A-201); and unconscionability (see
§ 2A-108).
'
3. U.C.C. § 2A-101 comment (1990). The drafters state that: "This codification was
greatly influenced by the fundamental tenet of the comn:10n law as it has developed with
respect to leases of goods: freedom of the parties to contract." Id.
4. The states which have adopted Article 2A are California, Florida, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nevada, Oklahoma,' Oregon, South Dakota and Utah. Telephone interview with John
McCabe, Legislative Director of-the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
·
State Laws (Jan. 6, 1991).
5. For a discussion of Article 2A as originally promulgated; see generally Symposium:
Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 ALA. L. REv., 559 (1988) [hereinafter
SYMPOSIUM].

.

6. In addition to the states which have adopted Article 2A it has reportedly been introduced in seven states. It has been estimated that twenty to twenty-five state legislatures
will propose Article 2A with its 1990 Amendments during 1991. Telephone Interview with
John McCabe, Legislative Director of the Nati.onal Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Jan. 6, 1991).
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In the Fall of 1988, Robert L. McCurley, Director of the Alabama Law Institute, empaneled a committee of Alabama attorneys
to consider the desirability of Alabama's enacting a uniform personal property leasing law. That committee (the "Alabama
Committee, or "Alabama Article 2A Committee") has worked on a
draft article since early 1989, and has developed a proposed act
that vindicates the interest of uniformity and addresses recurring
issues in a manner consistent with the principles of commercial
law, as developed in this state. The committee, which met in several cities throughout the state, has actively sought the input of
transactors concerned with personal property leasing law, and their
counsel.
Prior to this initiative, commercial law governing personal
property leasing had never been promulgated. Nevertheless, Alabama courts and transactors have drawn upon several sources of
law to resolve controversies attending personal property lease
transactions. The committee took notice of this existing body of
Alabama law in its consideration of the efficacy of the formulations
embodied in both the original uniform version of Article 2A7 and
the 1990 Uniform Amendments to Article 2A. 8
This Article attempts to facilitate Alabama's consideration of
Article 2A by exploring Alabama's existing law governing personal
property leases, and the likely effects of Article 2A on such law.
After initially examining a case which illustrates how Alabama
courts have applied Article 2 of the U.C.C., "Sales," as a source of
law to resolve personal property lease controversies, Part II of this
endeavor will focus upon the predominant body of law currently
governing personal property leases in Alabama: namely commonlaw "bailment for hire." Part III will then discuss selected provisions of the Alabama draft version of proposed Article 2A.

II.

ALABAMA's PERSONAL PRoPERTY LEASE LAw

A. Current Basis: Skelton v. Druid City Hospital Board9
Alabama's current treatment of personal property leasing is
deficient in two aspects. First, the volume of substantive personal
7. U.C.C. art. 2A (1989).
8. U.C.C. art. 2A (1990).
9. 459 So. 2d 818 (Ala. 1984).
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property lease law in Alabama is minimal. Courts and transacting
parties have very little law upon which to rely. Unlike the states
that have adopted Article 2A,10 Alabama has virtually no statutory
lease law governing personal property. Moreover, a court that faces
a personal property lease issue will find relatively few Alabama
cases dealing with personal property lease transactions. 11 Except
for those very few issues that have been litigated, most personal
property leasing questions remain unanswered in Alabama.
Second, the case law that does exist, for the most part, is inadequate. Alabama courts have primari~y relied upon the common
law of "bailment for hire" when dealing with personal property
''lease"12 issues.13 The common law term, "bailment for hire," can
be defined as a mutually beneficial transaction14 that involves the
hiring or letting of property to one party, the bailee, who takes the
property into his care and custody, and thereafter permits the
bailee's temporary use and possession of it. 15 The courts' application of common law bailment principles is appropriate because a
common law personal property lease is, by definition, a bailment
for hire. 16
Nevertheless, bailment law has sometimes proven inadequate
in resolving conflicts in modern lease transactions.17 Thus, in addressing this lack of authority, Alabama courts have occasionally
10. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
11. Farmer v. Machine Craft, 406 So. 2d 981, 982 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981) ("The law in
Alabama concerning bailments is exceedingly sparse.").
12. Hendon v. McCoy, 222 Ala. 515, 517, 133 So. 295, 296-97 (1931) ("The word 'lease'
is generally used with particular reference to real estate, resulting in the relation of landlord
and tenant. ..• But, when applied to personal property, it properly results in the relation of
bailor and bailee.") (citation omitted).
13. See Learned-Letcher Lumber Co. v. Fowler, 109 Ala. 169, 19 So. 396 (1896) (court
applied bailment law in determining duration of agreement where plaintiff agreed to pay per
diem rate for the use of defendant's oxen).
·
14. Aircraft Sales & Serv. v. Gantt, 255 Ala. 508, 511, 52 So. 2d 388, 391 ·(1951); see
also Heughan v. State, 82 Ga. App. 640, 645, 61 S.E.2d 685, 689 (1950) ("A bailment for hire
is a bailment for the mutual benefit of both parties.").
15. See infra text accompanying notes 80-92.
16. See U.C.C. § 2A-103 comment (j) (1990); see also Boss, Leases and Sales: Ne'er or
Where Shall the Twain Meet?, 1983 Aim. ST. L.J. 357, 364, nn.31-32 ("[T]he term lease has
become synonomous [sic] with the common law transaction called the 'bailment for
hire' ...•").
17. See Boss, Lease Chattel Paper: Unitary Treatment of a "Special" Kind of Commercial Specialty, 1983 DuKE L.J. 69, 73 (noting "the lack of refinement in the old common
law [of bailmentJU).
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relied upon the law of real estate,18 the law of contracts, 19 and direct20 and analogous 21 applications of Articles 2 and 9 of the
18. The drafters of Article 2A noted this practice of borrowing from the law of real
estate. See U.C.C. art. 2A foreword (1989) ("[U]nder present law, ... [personal property
transactions] are governed ... partly by principles relating to real estate leases ....").
Accord Aerowake Aviation v. Winter, 423 So. 2d 165, 166-67 (Ala. 1982) ("The dispute at
trial [court level] and on appeal concerns the nature of the parties' arrangements . . .
whether it was a bailment or merely a lease or license. If a bailment, [defendant] owe[s] a
duty as bailee to exercise ordinary and reasonable care for the protection of the [property].
If it [is] a lease or license, there would be no such duty ....").
Nevertheless, the more reasoned approach clearly rejects the application of real property principles to personal property transactions. The Supreme Court of Alabama has more
recently stated that: "[W]e reaffirm the rule that an action for conversion will not lie for the
taking of real property." Faith, Hope & Love, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank of Talladega County
N.A., 496 So. 2d 708, 711 (Ala. 1986). In other words,
[S]ince we necessarily are concerned with personal, rather than real, property a lease
is nothing more than a written agreement creating a common-law bailment for hire
for the mutual benefit of the parties, the bailor to receive the consideration for use of
the bailed property, and the bailee to receive the benefit of the use of the bailed
property during the term of the bailment. In more modern usage, long-term bailmenta for hire are usually referred to as leases, but this does not preclude application
of the common-law principles of bailment.
Buel Stone Corp. v. Buckeye Aeration Serv., No. 84AP-440 (Ohio App. January 31, 1985)
(WL 9837 at 5) (unpublished opinion).
At common law, "[r]eal estate [could] not be the subject of a bailment." W. ELLIOTT, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS§ 6, at 11 (W. Hemingway 2d ed. 1929).
Perhaps this is why some scholars have criticized the application of real estate principles to
modern lease transactions. See, e.g., Boss, supra note 16, at 369 n.54 (suggesting that only
analogies to real estate law should be used but not in toto application).
19. See Birmingham Television Corp. v. Water Works, 292 Ala. 147, 290 So. 2d 636
(1974); Woodson v. Hare, 244 Ala. 301, 303-04, 13 So. 2d 172, 174 (1943); Ex parte Mobile
Light & R.R., 211 Ala. 525, 101 So. 177 (1924); see also, e.g., Skelton v. Druid City Hosp.
Bd., 459 So. 2d 818, 821 (Ala. 1984) ("[O]ur legislature intended that [Ala. Code] § 7-2-315
[dealing with implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose] be broadly interpreted to
include transactions in which there is no actual transfer of title, such as rental and lease
transactions."); DeKalb Agresearch v. Abbott, 391 F. Supp. 152 (N.D. Ala. 1974) (when
transaction was determined to be lease and not sale, court applied common law and the law
of contracts rather than the U.C.C.), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1975).
20. See Skelton v. Druid City Hosp. Bd., 459 So. 2d 818 (Ala. 1984) (applying ALA.
ConE§ 7-2-313 to lease transactions); accord Baugh v. Bradford, 529 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1988).
See generally Note, Bailor Beware: Limitations and Exclusions of Liability in Commercial
Bailments, 41 VAND. L. REV. 129, 155-68 (1988) (discussion of the application of Article 2 to
bailment transactions).
21. See, e.g., Wilson v. World Omni Leasing, 540 So. 2d 713 (Ala. 1989) (applying
standard in section 2-302 of the U.C.C., governing unconscionability of contracts, by analogy
to lease agreements); Lloyd v. Service Corp. of Ala., 453 So. 2d 735, 741 (Ala. 1984) (The
court, in refusing to give effect to an exculpatory clause of a residential lease contract,
stated that: "[W]e think it reasonable for this court to apply [ALA. ConE] § 7-2-302 [dealing
with unconscionable contract clauses] by analogy to lease agreements.") (citing Weaver v.
American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 464, 276 N.E.2d 144, 148 (1971) ("The analogy is ra-
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U.C.C.22 As a result, Alabama law governing personal property
leases represents a patchwork of principles that have been articulated by various courts over the past century; to the detriment of
leasing parties, much of the available case law lacks continuity and
clarity.
The need to clarify personal prpperty lease law in Alabama is
perhaps best illustrated by the current analysis and treatment of
so-called "hybrid transactions"-those involving both goods and
services. 23 Courts have typically treated a hybrid transaction according to its predominant characteristic. 24 For example, a
transaction that involves both the sale and administration of
tiona!.")); Barco Auto Leasing Corp. v. PSI Cosmetics, 125 Misc. 2d 68, 478 N.Y.S.2d 505
(1984). But see DeKalb Agresearch v. Abbott, 391 F. Supp. 152, 153-54 (N.D. Ala. 1974)
(U.C.C. held not to apply to transaction determined to be lease and not a sale), aff'd, 511
F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1975).
22. See generally Boss, Panacea or Nightmare? Leases in Article 2, 64 B.UL. REv. 39,
42-45 (1984) (discussing "[t]he theoretical argument for including leases withing [sic] the
ambit of Article 2." Id. at 42); Note, Disengaging Sales Law From the Sale Construct: A
Proposal to Extend the Scope of Article 2 of the U.C.C, 96 HARv. L: REv. 470 (1982). But
see DeKalb Agresearch, 391 F. Supp. at 153-54 ("As this contract is a lease, it is not covered
by the Uniform Commercial Code, and is, therefore, dependent upon the common law and
the law of contracts for its construction and effect.") (footnotes omitted); Coakley & Williams, Inc. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 778 F.2d 196, 197 (4th Cir. 1985) (applying
Maryland law, the court found plaintiff to be a buyer of services, rather than goods; therefore, the Maryland version of U.C.C. Article 2 extended no warranty rights to a purchaser of
services), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1121 (1986).
23. See discussion infra note 34.
24. See Skelton v. Druid City Hasp. Bd., 459 So. 2d 818, 822 (Ala. 1984) (citing Berry
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 ill. 2d 54, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974)); Coakley & Williams, Inc. v.
Shatterproof Glass Corp., 778 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1121 (1986).
The "predominant purpose" test is the majority rule~ J. WHITE & R. SuMMERS, UNIFORM
CoMMERCIAL CoDE§ 1-1 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter WHITE & SuMMERS] (citing Bonebrake v.
Cox, 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974) and De Filippo v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 1313 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 912 (1975)). By contrast, under the minority rule, Article 2 would
apply only to the "sale of goods". aspects of the transaction. WHITE & SUMMERS § 1-1 (citing
the leading case of Foster v. Colorado Radio Corp., 381 F.2d 222 (lOth Cir. 1967)).
Professors White and Summers note that the "predominant purpose" test presupposes
that Article 2 should or should not be applied to the transaction as a whole, rather than
subjecting a single transaction to different bodies of law as under the minority rule. However, these commentators advocate the adoption of a more flexible rule, rather than strictly
adhering to the predominant puq)ose test. They suggest that the better approach is to allow
application of "two bodies of law-one to the goods aspect and one to the non-goods aspect .
• ., [as long as this would not present] 'insurmountable problems of proof in segregating
assets and determining their respective values at the time of the original contract and at the
time of resale, in order to apply two different measures of damages.' " WHITE & SuMMERS §
1-1, at 26 (quoting Hudson v. Town & Country True Value Hardware, 666 S.W.2d 51, 54
(Tenn. 1984)).
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drugs, as well as one that involves the sale and installation of windows, would fall entirely within the scope of Article 2 if the
predominant nature of the transaction is deemed a sale of goods. 2 ~
Similarly, in the absence of statutory lease law such as Article 2A,
Alabama courts might interpret a lease contract involving a hybrid
transaction by applying the provisions of the U.C.C. Article on
Sales, Article 2.
This was the case in Skelton v. Druid City Hospital Board, 26
where the plaintiff sued the manufacturer, distributor, salesperson
and administering hospital for damages suffered when a suturing
needle broke off in the plaintiff's body during a hernia operation. 27
The plaintiff, relying on section 7-2-315 of the Alabama Code,28 as
well as supplementation by common law,29 claimed that the defendants impliedly warranted that the needle was fit for its
intended purpose when "sold" to plaintiff. The trial court granted
partial summary judgment for defendant Druid City Hospital on
the grounds that the transaction was not a "sale" under the meaning of section 7-2-315, and that the hospital was not a merchant of
goods but a provider of services. Consequently, the trial court held
that there could be no implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose. 5°
The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed, rejecting defendant's characterization of the transaction as wholly consisting of a
"service," and instead, determined that the hospital's repeated use
of a defective suturing needle was "more akin to a lease or rental
of equipment than a sale."31 The Skelton court concluded that the
Alabama legislature "intended that § 7-2-315 be broadly inter25. Skelton v. Druid City Hosp. Bd., 459 So. 2d 818, 822 (Ala. 1984); see also discussion supra note 24.
26. Skelton, 459 So. 2d at 822.
27. ld. at 819.
28. Section 7-2-315 of the Alabama Code states that:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's
skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under section 7-2-316 an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such
purpose.
ALA. ConE § 7-2-315 (1984).
29. Skelton, 459 So. 2d at 820.
30. Id.
31. Skelton v. Druid City Hosp. Bd., 459 So. 2d 818, 821 (Ala. 1984) (emphasis in
original).
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preted to include transactions . . . such as rent'al and lease
transactions."32 The court reasoned that the transaction was, in
fact, a "hybrid" since it involved "both a· service transaction and a
'transaction in goods.' " 33
The Skelton court's application of commercial sales principles
to a lease transaction illustrates the problematic state of personal
property lease law in Alabama. Skelton provides some authority
for the application of Article 2 (especially the warranty provisions),
either directly or by analogy, to lease transactions.34 In the absence
32. Skelton, 459 So. 2d at 821; Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 lli. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d
550 (1974). But see Board of Educ. v. A, C & S, Inc., 131 lli. 2d 428, 546 N.E.2d 580 (1989)
(holding that Article 2 did not extend to leases on grounds of privity and notice).
33. Skelton, 459 So. 2d at 821 (emphasis in original).
34. The case also affects the analysis of hybrid transactions:
In light of the statement in the Official Comment to section 7-2-313, that the
warranty sections of Article 2 "need not be confined to sales contracts," we opine our
legislature intended that § 7-2-315 be broadly interpreted to include transactions in
which there is no actual transfer of title, such as rental and lease transactions.
Skelton, 459 So, 2d at 821- (emphasis in original). Skelton stands for the proposition that a
"lease" transaction involving the rendition of services may be subject to the pervasive lease
law, including Article 2A once adopted.
. . In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Torbert offers sensible guidance for the hybrid
transaction issues that will remain under Articles 2 and 2A. Applying principles set forth in
Caldwell v. Brown Serv. Funeral Home, 345 So. 2d 1341 (Ala. 1977), Chief Justice Torbert
suggests that, in hybrid transaction cases, courts ought to focus on the predominant element
of a transaction in determining whether the case should be treated as a "goods" or "services" transaction. Skelton, 459 So. 2d at 824 (Torbert, C.J., specially concurring). In
Caldwell, the plaintiffs had entered into an agreement with a funeral home by which defendant was to provide plaintiff with graveside services, a casket, and a vault following the
death of their son. As in Skelton, plaintiff sought from defendant both services and goods
necessary for the rendition of those services. Because the vault was found to be too small for
the casket, graveside services had to be conducted a second time. Plaintiffs sued the funeral
home for breach of the implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose. The Supreme
Court of Alabama found an implied warranty to exist even though the transaction was
clearly of a hybrid nature. See Caldwell, 345 So. 2d at 1342-43. The court's treatment of
such "hybrid" transactions is not unique. The Skelton court cited several cases as authority:
Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 lli. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974) (implied warranty found
where transaction involved distribution of birth control pills to plaintiff); Mauran v. Mary
Fletcher Hosp., 318 F. Supp. 297, 301 (D. Vt. 1970) (court construing Vermont law noted
that "the trend of decisions in Vermont and elsewhere indicates that the Supreme Court of
Vermont might very possibly recognize" implied warranties where transaction involved the
inadvertent administration of insulin rather than "preoperative medicine"); Newmark v.
Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969) (implied warranty found where transaction
involved administration of permanent wave solution to plaintiff's hair).
According to Chief Justice Torbert the central issue is:
[N]ot whether mixed or hybrid agreements [such as in Skelton and Caldwell] give
rise to the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) implied warranties, but rather how
agreements involving both a transaction in goods and a rendering of services are to be
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of statutory lease law, Skelton is presumably a source of lease law
in Alabama.
The problem, however, is the resulting imperfect fit between
Article 2 and lease transactions. Article 2, unlike proposed Article
2A, was not designed to meet the exigencies attending personal
property leases. Alabama's proposed Article 2A has been designed
as the mechanism by which Alabama can preemptively and comprehensively deal with an expanding area of commercial activity by
incorporating the best aspects of Alabama common law. Of course
classified so that it may then be detel'D:lined whether the U.C.C. implied warranties
apply.
Skelton, !159 So. 2d at 824 (Torbert, C.J., specially concurring). Chief Justice Torbert cited
for support Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974), in which the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals applied the same predominant factor analysis and concluded that a contract to supply and install bowling equipment was a transaction in goods even where the
performance of services was substantial. Thus, "the U.C.C. was held to be applicable." Skelton, 459 So. 2d at 824.
The determination of Articles 2 and 2A issues in the context of hybrid transactions
would, under this approach, hinge on the predominant characteristics of the agreement.
Where the transaction primarily involves a service with a lease of goods incidentally involved, the U.C.C. is less likely to be applicable. See Skelton, 459 So. 2d at 824-25 (Torbert,
C.J., specially concurring) (citing Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974)). Chief
Justice Torbert cited two cases as examples: Pitler v. Michael Reese Hosp., 92 lll. App. 3d
739, 415 N.E.2d 1255 (1980) (transaction involving radiation treatments deemed to involve
primarily services even though equipment was involved) and Ranger Constr. Co. v. Dixie
Floor Co., 433 F. Supp. 442 (D.S.C. 1977) (transaction involving installation of resilient
flooring deemed to involve primarily services). But where the transaction is predominantly a
sale (or lease), with labor incidentally involved, the U.C.C. is more likely applicable. See
Skelton, 459 So. 2d at 824-25 (Torbert, C.J., specially concurring) (citing Coakley & Williams, Inc. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 706 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1983) (contract to install
windows held to be predominantly sale of goods) and Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951 (8th
Cir. 1974) (contract to supply and install bowling equipment held to be predominantly a
transaction in goods)).
It is not uncommon for a transaction to fall within the purviews of both Article 2 and
one or more other statutes. WHITE & SuMMERS, supra note 24, § 1-1, at 24. Such transactions generally give rise to scope issues that fall into one of two categories: (1) cases where
goods are not involved at all, or cases which involve goods but where the transaction is not a
sale (such as a lease); and (2) hybrid cases where the transaction involves both goods and
services. WHITE & SuMMERS, supra note 24, § 1-1, at 25. See supra notes 23-33 and accompanying text regarding hybrid transactions.
Codification of Article 2A will not eliminate issues involving hybrid lease transactions.
Even if Alabama's proposed Article 2A is adopted, it is still inevitable that Alabama courts
will face hybrid transactions that concurrently fall under both Article 2 and Article 2A.
Thus, the hybrid transaction analyses, discussed supra notes 23-33 and accompanying text,
will remain relevant as to whether courts apply either Article 2 or Article 2A, or both, and
the common law of bailments, to the entire transaction. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note
24, § 1-1, at 26.
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if Article 2A is adopted, Skelton's holding that Article 2 should be
applied to leasing issues would become moot.
In addition to considering Skelton's impact, a proposal of Article 2A in Alabama would be incomplete without further
examination of the existing lease law, the common law of bailments. The Alabama bailment cases that exist deal mainly with ·a
bailee's obligations within the bailment relationship, sG as weii as
his ,duty to care for the bailed personal property.36 While these
bailment cases reflect only one aspect of a lease transaction, they
do comprise most of Alabama's existing personal property lease
law and are, therefore, pertinent to the proposal of an Article 2A
that is tailored for Alabama.

B. Historical Basis: Development of the Law of Bailments
1. The Importance of Historical Analysis.-An understanding of the common law of bailments is a prerequisite to the proper
application of modern leasing principles. Assume, for example,
that two individuals, "A" and "B," wish to enter into an agreement
in which A retains legal title to a certain automobile while possession is temporarily transferred to B. Both A and B agree that the
transaction is to be accomplished according to any one of the following seven hypotheticals: (1) A pledges the car as security for a
debt that he owes to B, and B is vested with the right to sell the
car in the event of default; (2) A agrees to let B use the vehicle one
weekend, yet A receives no corresponding benefit or compensation;
(3) after paying B a fee, A parks his own car in B's parking lot,
taking his keys with him; (4) while at a restaurant A allows B, for a
fee, to valet-park the vehicle, after which B maintains possession
and, consequently, control over the vehicle; (5) A allows B to valetpark A's car, and thereafter, A's car keys are returned to him; (6) A
pays B a monthly fee in exchange for the use of a particular parking space; or (7) B pays A a monthly fee and, in exchange, B
receives A's permission to possess and use the vehicle under certain terms.
In each of these agreements, issues involving contract formation and construction, warranties, and the rights and concomitant
35. See infra notes 106-24 and accompanying text. , .
36. See infra notes 125-42 and accompanying text.
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duties of A and Bare not only dependent upon the attendant contractual terms, but also upon the common law characterization of
the transaction. 37 Common law bailments such as the "pawn" and
"loan," examples (1) and (2),38 can easily be confused with other
transactions such as the lease of real property found in example
(6). 39 Even though the historical development of modern leasing
principles is deeply rooted in the common law bailment transaction, some types of bailments, such as those in examples (1) and
(2), are not predecessors of modern personal property leases, as
contrasted with example (7), which is such a predecessor. 40
Whether a court or an attorney chooses to characterize a particular agreement as a bailment or as some other type of
transaction may be both the threshold and the dispositive issue in
the case. 41 Also, whether a judge or an attorney can distinguish between the various kinds of bailments may determine the outcome
of an action. Since a lease of personal property is a derivative of
the "bailment for hire," an analysis of Article 2A's effect on Alabama should consider the state's bailment cases.
When reviewing Alabama's common law, a two-tier analysis
may facilitate an understanding of Article 2A's application to a
particular transaction. First, one must decide whether a bailment
is involved as opposed to some other type of transaction. Second, if
37. However, the drafters have made clear their intent to maintain Article 2A's flexible application:
A court may apply this Article by analogy to any transaction, regardless of form,
that creates a lease of personal property other than goods, taking into account the
expressed intentions of the parties to the transaction and any differences between a
lease of goods and a lease of other property. Such application has precedent as the
provisions of the Article on Sales (Article 2) have been applied by analogy to leases of
goods. . . . Whether such application would be appropriate for other bailments of
personal property, gratuitous or for hire, should be determined by the facts of each
case.
Further, parties to a transaction creating a lease of personal property other than
goods, or a bailment of personal property may provide by agreement that this Article
applies. Upholding the parties' choice is consistent with the spirit of this Article.
ALA. U.C.C.- LEASES § 7-2A-102 comment (Ala. L. Inst. Official Working Draft 1990) [hereinafter DRAFT ALA. ConE] (citations omitted) (adopted verbatim from Uniform Article 2A).
38. See infra note 44 regarding Roman classifications of bailments.
39. See, e.g., Mobile Parking Stations v. Lawson, 53 Ala. App. 181, 298 So. 2d 266
(1974); see infra text accompanying notes 58-72.
40. Personal property leases can only be traced to one type of bailment-the bailment
for hire. See infra notes 80-92 and accompanying text.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 55-80, distinguishing bailments from other similar transactions such as a real property lease or license.
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the transaction is a bailment, one must decide whether it is a
"bailment for hire" (that is, a personal property lease) or some
other type of bailment.
2. Origin and Adoption.-The legal doctrines governing bailments42 have descended to Alabama primarily from the English
case of Coggs v. Bernard,43 in which the court adopted the Roman
system of classifying bailments.44 The common law definition of a
bailment was adopted by Alabama in Farmer v. Machine Craft. 415
In Farmer, the plaintiff filed suit against his employer to recover
42. The bailment transaction has been subject to various definitions over the years•.
See, e.g., W. ELLI01T, supra note 18, § 1; J. STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS § 2 (6th ed. 1856). The term "bailment" derives from the French word, "bailler,"
which means "to deliver." J . STORY§ 2, at 1. Justice Story defined a bailment generally as "a
delivery of a thing mtrust for some special object or purpose, and upon a contract, expressed or implied, tO conform to the object or purpose of the trust." J. STORY § 2, at 3.
Alabama adopted a slightly different definition of a bailment in Farmer v. Machine
Craft, 406 So. 2d 981, 982 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981) (" 'delivery of personal property by one
person to another in trust for a specific purpose, with a contract, express or implied, that
the trust shall be faithfully executed, and the property returned or duly accounted for when
the special purpose is accomplished, or kept until the bailor reclaims it.' "). (quoting 8 AM.
JUR. 2D Bailments § 2 (1980)). At common law "[t]he subject-matter of a bailment is always
personal property." W. ELLI01T, supra note 18, § 6, at 11.
Article 2A states that "[a]t common law a lease of personal property is a bailment for
hire. While there are several definitions of bailment for hire, all require a thing to be let and
a price for the letting." U.C.C. § 2A-103 comment (j) (1990).
43. 2 Ld. Raymond 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B. 1703). See generally W. ELLI01T,
supra note 18, § 3, at 5-6; Boss, supra note 22, at 100 n.292 ("Coggs stands for the proposition, inter alia, that a bailee is not an insurer absolutely liable for damage to the bailed
property, but he is responsible for his negligent acts.")(citing R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PER·
SONAL PROPERTY § 11.1, at 252-53 (3d ed. 1975)).
44. The six classes of bailments under Roman law were: (1) Depositum (deposit)-a
bailment merely for custody without compensation; (2) Mandatum (mandate)-a bailment
where the bailee performs some service without compensation; (3) Commodatum (gratuitous
loan)-a gratuitous bailment of goods for bailee's use; (4) Mutuum (loan of chattels)-a
bailment where the original goods are not delivered back to the bailor but are replaced
instead by similar goods. The transaction is not considered a true bailment at common law
but rather is a sale or exchange; (5) Pignus (pawn or pledge)-a bailment where goods are
pledged or pawned as a security for a debt and the bailee may sell the goods in the event of
default; (6) locatio (hiring)-a bailment for reward or a hiring. This last category was further divided into locatio rei, concerning the hired use of a thing, and locatio operis,
concerning the hired services of a thing. A locatio-operis was even further characterized into
three subparts. W. ELLI01T, supra note 18, § 4, at 8. These classifications have been criticized as "crude." J. ScHOULER, THE LAw OF BAILMENTS INCLUDING PLEDGE, INNKEEPERS, AND
CARRIERS § 5, at 4 n.1 (1905). See also R. BROWN, supra note 43, § 10.1; W. ELLI01T, supra
note 18, §§ 3, 4.
The concept of bailments was codified as early as the Code of Hammurabi and the
Mosaic Law. W. ELL101T, supra note 18, § 3, at 5 n.6.
45. 406 So. 2d 981 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981).
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for losses resulting from the theft of a toolbox that plaintiff voluntarily left at work.46 The plaintiff was required by the defendant to
supply his own tools. Employees were allowed to leave their tools
at work overnight, even though the defendant knew that its security system was inoperative. Although some employees were aware
that the system did not work, and chose to take their tools home at
night, the plaintiff opted to leave his tools. The defendant's building was burglarized and plaintiff's property was stolen. Plaintiff
brought suit on a bailment theory, alleging that the defendant had
neglected to maintain its alarm system and, therefore, had failed to
exercise ordinary care in securing the bailed personal property.47
The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant. On
appeal, the court reasoned that the case turned on whether, as a
matter of law, a bailment existed between plaintiff and defendant.48 The court held that the elements of a bailment include: 1)
actual or constructive change of possession;49 2) voluntary assumption of custody and possession of the property;~0 3) actual or
constructive change in control over the item; and 4) the bailee's
intentional exercise of control. ~ 1
In spite of defendant's occasional possession of the property,
the court held that no bailment was created because no change in
46. Farmer, 406 So. 2d at 982.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. See also, e.g., Mobile Parking Stations v. Lawson, 53 Ala. App. 181, 185, 298
So. 2d 266, 269 (1974) (bailment to park car for owner was terminated when parking attendant relinquished possession and control of vehicle by returning keys to owner); Kravitz v.
Parking Serv. Co., 240 Ala. 467, 467, 199 So. 731, 732 (1940) (bailee's "duties of reasonable
care spring out of his possession"); Ridgely Operating Co. v. White, 227 Ala. 459, 462, 150
So. 693, 695 (1933) ("such possession may be constructive, growing out of the relation of the
parties").
50. Farmer v. Machine Craft, 406 So. 2d 981, 982 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981). See also Kravitz v. Parking Serv. Co., 240 Ala. 467, 467, 199 So. 731, 732 (1940) ("An essential element of
bailment is possession in the bailee."); Ridgely Operating Co. v. White, 227 Ala. 459, 462,
150 So. 693, 695 (1933) ("It is undoubtedly true that a bailee must have possession of the
property.").
51. Farmer, 406 So. 2d at 983 (citing 8 AM. JuR. 2D Bailments § 66 (1980)). See, e.g.,
Mobile Parking Stations v. Lawson, 53 Ala. App. 181, 185, 298 So. 2d 266, 269 (1974) (no
bailment found at time when car was stolen where plaintiff left car at defendant's parking
lot and took keys with him); Ex parte Mobile Light & R.R., 211 Ala. 525, 527, 101 So. 177,
178 (1924) (no bailment found where car owner paid to park car in defendant's lot); see also
Ho Bros. Restaurant v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 492 So. 2d 603, 605 (Ala. 1986) (court
distinguished bailment from meaning of "entrustment" used within exculpatory clause of
insurance contract).

1990]

Alabama Lease

Law~

115

control took place.IS2 The Farmer court concluded that, in the absence of a bailment, the defendant had no duty to protect the
property.ISs Thus, a bailment transaction under Alabama common
law is found only where one party voluntarily and intentionally assumes possession and control, either actual or _constructive, of
personal property on behalf of, or in trust for, another.IS4 Clearly, _a personal property lease would constitute such a bailment.
3. Distinguishing the Common Law of Bailments.-_A modern lease transaction can be more clearly understood when the
bailment is distinguished from similar. transactions such as a license,ISIS sale,IS6 or real property lease.67 Drawing a bright line,.
however, has sometimes proved to be a problematic task for Alabama courts, and which in turn has contributed to the conf~sion
regarding personal pr()perty lease principles in Alabama.
The case of Mobile Parking Stations v. Lawson1S8 offers just
such an example.- Plaintiff turned his car over to·a parking attendant at defendant's parking lot.IS9 The attendant parked the vehicle, _
locked it, and then returned the key~ to plaintiff. 60 The plaintiff
alleged that the attendant assured him that the lot was a "24-hour
lot," although a sign stated that the lot was monitored only from
6:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. 61 Plaintiff, intending his son to pi_ck up the .
car later, left money in the trimk so his son could pay any additional parking fees. 62 The attendant, not wanting to be responsible
for the money left in the trunk, directed plaintiff to leave the keys
at the bus station across the street.63 Later, the vehicle was stolen
from the parking lot and the plaintiff sued, claiming that a bailment existed and that defendant had converted the car. 64
The transaction in Lawson is similar to that of ·a bailment.·
The defendant had taken temporary possession of· th~ person8.I
52.
53.
J 54.
55.
56.
57.
58. ,
. 59.
·60.
61.
. 62.
63.
64.

Farmer, 406 So. 2d at 983.
Id.
Id. at 982-83.
See infra notes 58-72 & 79 and accompanying text; see also supra note 41.
See infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text; see also supra note 41.
See infra notes 58-72 & 79 and accompanying text.
53 Ala. App. 181, 298 So. 2d 266 (1974}.

Lawson, 53 Ala. App. at 183, 298 So. 2d at 267.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lawson, 53 Ala. App. at 183, 298 So. 2d at 267.

116

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 42:1:101

property on plaintiff's behalf. Nevertheless, the court found that
no bailment existed. siS In determining what duty of care was owed
by the attendant, the court analyzed similar cases and attempted
to clarify the differences between a bailment, a license, and a lease
(here, a lease of real, not personal, property-namely, plaintiff's
lease of a space in the parking lot). 66
The court determined that a bailment would exist only where
automobile owners leave their keys with attendants who voluntarily assume custody and control over the cars. 67 If, however, the
owner only gives permission to the attendant to park the car in a
convenient place but does not give him dominion or custody of the
vehicle, the transaction is a license.68 In addition, the court noted
that a lease is formed where a specific parking space is assigned to
the owner for his exclusive use. 69
The Lawson court concluded that the defendant did not have
custody or control of the vehicle, as is necessary in the case of a
true bailment and, therefore, was not liable for the theft. 70 After
the attendant parked the car and relinquished possession to the
65. Id. at 185, 298 So. 2d at 269.
66. Id. at 184, 298 So. 2d at 268.
67. Mobile Parking Stations v. Lawson, 53 Ala. App. 181, 184, 298 So. 2d 266, 267
(1974) (citing Lewis v. Ebersole, 244 Ala. 200, 203-04, 12 So. 2d 543, 544 (1943)).
68. Lawson, 53 Ala. App. at 184, 298 So. 2d at 268 (license is distinct from a bailment
or a lease). The Supreme Court of Alabama has stated that:
A lease is a contract for the possession and profit of land by the lessee, and a recompense ... to the lessor, ... [while a] license is an authority to do some act or series of
acts on the land of another, for the benefit of the licensee, without passing any estate
in the land ....
Holt v. City of Montgomery, 212 Ala. 235, 237, 102 So. 49, 50 (1924) (quoting Stinson v.
Hardy, 27 Or. 584, 41 P. 116, 118 (1895)), quoted in Mason v. Carroll, 289 Ala. 610, 612, 269
So. 2d 879, 880 (1972). See also Steward v. St. Regis Paper Co., 484 F. Supp. 992, 995 (S.D.
~a. 1979) ("A lease conveys an interest in realty, while a license conveys only the right to
do some act or acts on the land of another, which is an interest in personalty and does not
pass any estate in the land.")(citing Holt, 212 Ala. at 237, 102 So. at 50). Under this test a
lease is presumed if the contract " 'gives exclusive possession of the premises against all
the world, including the owner.'" I d. (emphasis in original) (quoting Holt v. City of Montgomery, 212 Ala. 235, 237, 102 So. 49, 50-51 (1924)); Brown v. Five Points Parking Center,
121 Ga. App. 819, 175 S.E.2d 901 (1970) (holding that an agreement between plaintiff (car
owner) and defendant ("lock and park" garage owner) was a license rather than a bailment
where such was stated on parking ticket that plaintiff signed).
69. Lawson, 53 Ala. App. at 185, 298 So. 2d at 268 (where parking attendant merely
directs the owner as to where to park, and the owner retains the keys, there has been no
bailment, merely a license on the use of realty) (citing Lewis v. Ebersole, 244 Ala. 200, 20304, 12 So. 2d 543, 544 (1943)).
70. Id. at 185, 298 So. 2d at 269.
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owner by returning the keys, the defendant became a lessor of a
parking space rather than a bailee of the vehicle.'7 1 Depending on
the particular facts, a relatively simple and common act such as
leaving a car at a parking lot or with a valet can be characterized
as one of several different forms of transactions. The Lawson court
confused the issue further by using _the term "lease" rather than
the term "bailment."72 Regrettably, the court did not clarify that
the lease in this case was one of real, rather than personal,
property.
In another case, DeKalb Agresearch v. Abbott,'73 the court addressed the threshold issue of whether a transaction was a sale or a
personal property lease (a common law bailment for hire).' The
court's distinction between these two transactions determined
what law was to be applied-common law of "bailments for hire"
or Article 2 of the U.C.C. In DeKalb, the plaintiff contracted to
lease hens and eggs to defendant for breeding.'74 Plaintiff retained
title to the hens and eggs, and defendant agreed not to sell or dispose of them without the plaintiff's consent. 76 Plaintiff moved for
summary judgment on defendant's counterclaim that alleged
breach of various express and implied warranties. '76 The court concluded that, based on the contract terms, the arrangement was in
fact a lease and not a sale.'77 So the common law of both bailments
and contracts was applied.'7s
As Lawson and DeKalb illustrate, courts struggle with transactions that might more appropriately be handled as personal
property leases under Article 2A.'79 A transaction may simultaneously resemble a common law bailment, a license, and a real
property lease as in Lawson; or a lease may resemble a sale as in
DeKalb. Interestingly, Article 2A would govern cases such as
DeKalb where a personal property lease is found; and of course, if
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 391 F. Supp. 152 (N.D. Ala. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1975).
74. DeKalb, 391 F. Supp. at 153.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. I d. at 154 (The court accurately reasoned that the U.C.C. was not applicable to the
lease but would have applied if the transaction had been deemed a contract of sale.).
79. This struggle is clearly illustrated by the recent case of Skelton v. Druid City
Hasp. Bd., 459 So. 2d 818 (Ala. 1984); see supra notes 24-34 and accompanying text.
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the parties in DeKalb had been guided by a codification of applicable lease law, litigation might have been avoided.
Distinguishing the common law bailment from other similar
transactions is undoubtedly critical to any analysis of modern leasing issues. But before Article 2A principles will be deemed
applicable, an _agreement must not only meet the requirements of a
common law bailment, but the transaction must also specifically
fall within the "bailment for hire" classification. 80 A "bailment for
hire" is the only transaction considered by Alabama common law
to be a lease of personal property. 81 Thus, identifying the differences between "bailments for hire" and other types of bailments is
essential to an understanding of personal property leases.
C. Distinguishing Bailment for Hire
The common law antecedent of the personal property lease
was the locatio-rei bailment, in which both parties benefitted from
the hiring of a thing.82 This "bailment for hire,"83 or "bailment for
80. See Farmer v. Machine Craft, 406 So. 2d 981 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981); see also supra
notes 41-42 and accompanying text; cf. Dunavant Enter. v. Strachan Shipping Co., 730 F.2d
665 (11th Cir. 1984) (court found that bailment relationship fell within admiralty jurisdiction and that maritime common law supplied elements of bailment).
Draft Article 2A defines a "lease" as "a transfer of the right to possession and use of
goods for a term in return for consideration." DRAFT ALA. ConE § 7-2A-103(1)(j) (1990)
(drafted verbatim from Uniform version). The drafters explain in the comments that:
At common law a lease of personal property is a bailment for hire. While there are
several definitions of bailment for hire, all require a thing to be let and a price for the
letting. Thus, in modern terms and as provided in this definition, a lease is created
when the lessee agrees to furnish consideration for the right to the possession and use
of goods over a specified period of time.
DRAFT ALA. ConE § 7-2A-103 comment (j) (1990).
81. Accord Bain v. Culbert, 209 Ala. 312, 313, 96 So. 228, 229 (1923); Prince v. Alabama State Fair, 106 Ala. 340, 342, 17 So. 449, 450 (1894); see also supra note 80 and infra
notes 82-92.
82. See J. STORY, supra note 42, § 368, at 323-24. Justice Story criticizes this definition
as "incomplete" and articulates his own definition of a bailment for hire as also including
cases of the hiring or letting "of labor and services, and of the carriage of goods." I d. at 324.
83. Use of the term "bailment for hire" is common. See, e.g., Atmore Truckers Aas'n v.
Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 218 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1955); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. J.B.
Maynard Constr., 259 Ala. 623, 625, 67 So. 2d 893, 895 (1953) (bailment "for hire and use"
created when railroad company delivered cars containing ordered materials and turned control over to construction company); Dixie Drive It Yourself Sys., Mobile Co. v. Hames, 34
Ala. App. 619, 622, 43 So. 2d 140, 142, cert. denied, 253 Ala. 132, 43 So. 2d 143 (1949)
("bailee for hire"); U.C.C. § 2A-103 comment (j) (1990) ("At common law a lease of personal
property is a bailment for hire."); see also Bain v. Culbert, 209 Ala. 312, 313, 96 So. 228, 229
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mutual benefit,"84 is notably different in character and effect from
other bailment transactions. The distinction is often crucial.
Alabama courts have recognized that accurate characterization
of the transaction usually determines liability.815 No special duty of
care will exist if a court finds that no bailment was established.86 If
a court does find a bailment, the bailee's duty will depend on
whether a "bailment for hire" (a lease of personal pr~perty) or
some other kind of bailment was established.
Although terminology and classification have historically varied,87 Alabama courts have generally delineated three types of
bailments. 88 The first exists where possession of an object is conveyed by the bailor so~ely to benefit the bailee.89 While this kind of
bailment is referred to as a "gratuitous bailment," 90 a better char(1923) ("lucrative bailment" is a relationship involving more than a gratuitous bailment).
See also generally J. STORY, supra note 42, § 368 (The terms "bailment for mutual benefit"
and "bailment for hire" are sometimes referred to as "lucrative" bailments).
84. This term is used synonymously with "bailment for hire." See Aircraft Sales &
Serv. v. Gantt, 255 Ala. 508, 511, 52 So. 2d 388, 391 (1951); White Swan Laundry v. Blue,
223 Ala. 663, 137 So. 898 (1931).
'
85. Sometimes, however, different characterizations of a transaction may result in the
same disposition. See DeKalb Agresearch v. Abbott, 391 F. Supp. 152 (N.D. Ala. 1974)
(holding that transaction was lease and not a sale, stated that results would be the same if
the transaction had been deemed a sale as plaintiff contended), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1162 (5th
Cir. 1975).
86. See Mobile Parking Stations v. Lawson, 53 Ala. App. 181, 298 So. 2d 266 (1974);
see supra notes 58-72 and accompanying text.
87. See W. ELLIOTT, supra note 18, § 3, at 5-6; J. STORY, ·supra note 42, § 3, at·6-9.
From the six Roman divisions of bailments four basic groupings emerged: (1) bailments
for the bailor's sole benefit, (2) bailments for the bailee's sole benefit, (3) ordinary bailments
for mutual benefit, and (4) exceptional bailments (which included "postmasters, innkeepers,
and common carriers"). See W. ELLIOTT, supra note 18, § 4, at 6-9; see also supra note 44.
88. Under Alabama law, bailments may also be termed either "gratuitous" or "lucrative." See Bain v. Culbert, 209 Ala. 312, 313, 96 So. 228, 229 (1923); Prince v. Alabama State
Fair, 106 Ala. 340, 342, 17 So. 449, 450 (1894). The classification of bailments as "gratuitous" usually includes bailments for the sole benefit of the bailor, as well as bailments for
the sole benefit of the bailee. J. ScHOULER, supra note 44; § 6, at 4; see supra text accompanying notes 82-87. Thus, a "lucrative" bailment would be tantamount to a bailment for
mutual benefit. See, e.g., Ridgely Operating Co. v. White, 227 Ala. 459, 462, 150 So. 693, 695
(1933) ("It is also true that, to require the duty of ordinary care upon a bailee, there must
be some sort of consideration.").
·
89. See, e.g., Glenn v. Blackman, 33 Ala. App. 571, 575, 35 So. 2d 698, 701 (court
found .that, at the time when bailed property was damaged, defendant was a bailee for his
own benefit), cert. denied, 250 Ala. 664, 35 So. 2d 702 (1948).
· 90. See supra note 88.

120

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 42:1:101

acterization of the transaction is probably that of a "loan."91 Under
this arrangement, the bailee owes the greatest duty to care for the
bailor's goods and is liable for the slightest negligence. 92
The second classification is where the bailment is formed primarily for custodial purposes, such as with a deposit. This
transaction, known as a "bailment for the sole benefit of the
bailor," is also distinct from a personal property lease.93 Under a
bailment for the sole benefit of the bailor, the bailee owes the
bailor only a slight degree of care for the property and is therefore
liable only for gross negligence. 94
The modern personal property lease can be traced directly to
the third common law classification-"the bailment for hire,'' 9~
sometimes called a "bailment for mutual benefit."98 In this transaction, under an agreement for consideration,97 the bailee takes
property into his custody and care, and has temporary possession
and use of the property.98
91. 8 C.J.S. Bailments § 18 (1988) ("A bailment can be structured for the sole benefit
of the bailee ... and is sometimes referred to as a 'loan.'" (footnotes omitted)).
92. See, e.g., Glenn, 33 Ala. App. at 575, 35 So. 2d at 701 ("bailee for his own sole
benefit ... owed extraordinary care toward the bailed property") (citing Thomas v. Hackney, 192 Ala. 27, 29, 68 So. 296, 296 (1915) (Hackney court stated that a gratuitous bailee,
in contrast to the bailee in Glenn, is "obligated to the owner of the [bailed property] only to
the exercise of slight care, and [is] only liable for gross neglect or bad faith.'')).
93. Like a gratuitous bailment for the sole benefit of the bailee, a bailment for the sole
benefit of the bailor is sometimes styled as a "gratuitous bailment.'' See W. ELLIOTI, supra
note 18, § 16, at 29-30.
94. See Lincoln Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Armes, 217 Ala. 464, 117 So. 46 (1928) (gratuitous bailee holding books for bailor). The Lincoln court added that a gratuitous bailee may
be "only liable for gross negligence or misconduct resulting in the [property's] loss or destruction." Id. at 464, 117 So. at 46. See also Bain v. Culbert, 209 Ala. 312, 313, 96 So. 228,
229 (1923) (gratuitous bailee "only liable for gross negligence or bad faith in the premises");
see generally W. ELLIOTI, supra note 18, § 24, at 47 ("liable only for gross negligence"); J.
ScHOULER, supra note 44, § 7.
95. W. ELLI01T, supra note 18, § 24, at 47.
96. See Boss, supra note 16, at 364 nn.31-32; Boss, supra note 17, at 73 n.23.
97. See Atmore Truckers Ass'n v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 218 F.2d 461, 464 (5th
Cir. 1955); see also supra text accompanying note 80.
The drafters of Article 2A state that "in modern terms and as provided in this definition, a lease is created when the lessee agrees to furnish consideration for the right to the
possession and use of goods over a specified period of time.'' U.C.C. § 2A-103 comment (j)
(1990).
98. See Boss, supra note 17, at 74 (discussing the division between absolute property
rights and "special property" rights).
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In Atmore Truckers Association v. Westchester Fire Insurance Co.,99 the issue of liability turned on the court's
determination of whether defendant was a bailee for hire or a gratuitous bailee.100 The owner of a quantity of rayon yarn agreed to
pay defendant a monthly fee in return for the yarn's storage. 101
Mter the yarn was damaged by a fire while in the custody of the
bailee, plaintiff insurer sued on the owner's behalf to recover for
losses caused by fire and water damage. 102 On appeal, the defendant bailee asserted that the transaction was a gratuitous bailment
and, therefore, liability would exist only if the bailee had been
grossly negligent. 103 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished between a bailee for hire and a gratuitous bailee.104 The
court held that the hallmark of a bailment for hire is the existence
of consideration.106 Of course, any monthly fee paid to the bailee
for storage of the yarn would constitute such consideration.
The transaction in Atmore differs slightly from the modern
commercial lease because the bailee accepted money for taking
possession of the property. Conversely, in a personal property lease
today, the party in possession (the lessee) pays for the right to
have temporary possession and control. However, Atmore clearly
illustrates a true bailment for hire and demonstrates that the common law duty to care for the property is still applicable to modern
lease transactions.
99. 218 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1955).
100. Atmore, 218 F.2d at 464, aff'g 120 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. Ala. 1954).
101. Id. at 463-64.
102. Id. at 461.
103. Id. at 463.
104. Atmore Truckers Ass'n v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 218 F.2d 461, 464 (5th Cir.
1955).
105. The Atmore court stated:
"The general rule as to the consideration of a contract is well understood, and is the
same in [the] case of the bailments as in all other contracts. The law does not undertake to determine the adequacy of a consideration. That is left to the parties, who are
the sole judges of the benefits or advantages to be derived from their contracts. It is
sufficient if the consideration be of some value, though slight, or of a nature which
may inure to the benefit of the party making the promise. Where such a consideration exists, a contract cannot be said to be a nudum pactum; [sic] nor a bailment, a
gratuitous undertaking."
Atmore, 218 F.2d at 464 (quoting Prince v. Alabama State Fair, 106 Ala. 340, 345-46, 17 So.
449, 450 (1894)).

122

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 42:1:101

D. Duties Owed by the Bailee for Hire
1. Duties Imposed by Law.-Once a transfer of personal
property is determined to be a bailment for hire (personal property
lease), the duties, rights and liabilities of the transacting parties
are determined both by the standard of care imposed by common
law106 and either the express107 or implied108 bailment contract itself.109 Generally, the bailee for hire (lessee) will be held to an
ordinary level of diligence, 110 and will therefore be answerable only
for a failure to exercise such degree of care. 111 The parties, however, retain considerable flexibility in extending or limiting their
obligations by contract. 112
106. Bailment law sometimes looks to custom and usage of trade in order to fill any
missing contract terms. Boss, supra note 22, at 52 n.81.
107. See, e.g., Romine Constr. Co. v. Ted Warnke, Inc., 477 So. 2d 345 (Ala. 1985)
(express oral contract for bailment); DeKalb Agresearch v. Abbott, 391 F. Supp. 152, 154
(N.D. Ala. 1974) (clear and unambiguous contract controls with respect to claim for breach
of implied warranty in bailment or lease), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1975).
108. See White Swan Laundry v. Blue, 223 Ala. 663, 665, 137 So. 898, 899 (1931) (common law recognizes an implied obligation to exercise reasonable care in bailment for mutual
benefit, in absence of express agreement to the contrary); Ex parte Mobile Light & R.R.,
211 Ala. 525, 527, 101 So. 177, 178 (1924); Kravitz v. Parking Serv. Co., 240 Ala. 467, 468,
199 So. 731, 732 (1940); W. HALE, HAND-BOOK ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS § 14,
at 51 (1896).
109. J. ScHOULER, supra note 44, § 10; see also DeKalb Agresearch v. Abbott, 391 F.
Supp. 152, 154 (N.D. Ala. 1974) (concerning allegations of breach of implied warranty in
bailment or lease arrangements court stated that "a contract between the parties which is
clear and unambiguous as to their requisite responsibilities, or lack of same, controls the
relationship."), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1975).
110. "Ordinary care" has been defined in a bailment case as "that degree of care with
respect to the property which a man of average prudence and diligence would bestow on his
own like property under like conditions. The law denominates this degree of care as ordinary care.'' Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. J.B. Maynard Constr. Co., 259 Ala. 623, 625, 67 So.
2d 893, 895 (1953) (citing Higman v. Camody, 112 Ala. 267, 272, 20 So. 480, 482 (1895)).
111. Dixie Drive It Yourself Sys., Mobile Co. v. Hames, 34 Ala. App. 619, 622, 43 So.
2d 140, 143 (bailee breached duty of care when he released automobile from garage to a
third party without a claim check), cert. denied, 253 Ala. 132, 43 So. 2d 143 (1949); see also
Anniston Lincoln-Mercury v. Mayse, 341 So. 2d 949, 950 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977) (automobile
stolen while left with bailee for repairs); White Swan Laundry v. Blue, 223 Ala. 663, 665, 137
So. 898, 899 (1931) ("reasonable care to preserve the property from loss or injury").
112. See White Swan Laundry v. Blue, 223 Ala. 663, 137 So. 898 (1931). C{. Cloud v.
Moon, 290 Ala. 33, 273 So. 2d 196 (1973) (bailor has duty to warn bailee of dangerous condition such as likelihood of truck burning or exploding after delivery to bailee for repairs);
Aircraft Sales & Serv. v. Gantt, 255 Ala. 508, 52 So. 2d 388 (1951) (certain legal duties were
imposed on the bailor/owner in the absence of express contrary agreement where bailor's
breach of care resulted in bailee's crashing the leased airplane).
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Part of the bailee's obligation involves the legal duty of care
for the bailed property. The bailee's general standard 'of care varies
according to how the agreement is categorized at common law. 113
In a bailment for hire the bailee will generally114 be held to a reasonable degree of diligence to care for the property. 11~
The court in Atmore,116 having found a bailment for hire, held
that the issue of liability was dependent upon whether defendant
had met his obligation of ordinary and reasonable care.117 Similarly, the. court in Anniston Lincoln-Mercury v. Mayse, 118 held
that defendant, a bailee for hire, was obligated to use ordinary care
when an automobile was temporarily left with him for repairs. 119
Plaintiff sued after his vehicle was stolen, and the Alabama Court
of Civil Appeals held that recovery under a tort theory is possible
in a bailnient.120 In affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, the court
concluded that prima facie negligence will be imputed to a bailee
for hire when he fails, upon demand, to either redeliver the property to the bailor or to account for his failure to do so. 121
In addition to liability in tort, a bailee for hire may have certain implied contractual obligations. For example, the common law
requir~s that the bailee in every bailment execute the contract in
an honest and good-faith manner.122 A court may also find the constructive duty to exercise a reasonable degree of care for the bailed
goods based solely on the bailment relationship. 123 Moreover, in
113. See supra text accompanying notes 80-105.
114. The general duties of a bailee for hire may be modified by express contrary agreement. See infra text accompanying notes 125-42.
115. White Swan Laundry, 223 Ala. at 665, 137 So. at 899.
116. 218 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1955).
117. Atmore, 218 F.2d at 464.
118. 341 So. 2d 949 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977).
119. Mayse, 341 So. 2d at 949-50.
120. Id. at 950.
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reeves,_ 440 So. 2d 1086, 1088-89 (Ala. Civ. App.
1983) (bailee denied recovery when he did not act in good faith while repairing bailed automobile since he failed to comply with the Abandoned Motor Vehicle Act); Birmingham
Loan Co. v. Klinner, 39 Ala..App. 125, 128, 95 So. 2d 402, 404-05 (1957) (" 'If the bailee •.•
in good faith in fulfillment of the terms of the bailment •.. restores the property to the
bailor before he is notifi~d that the true owner will look to him for it, no action will lie
against him, for he has only done what was his duty.' ") (quoting Nelson v. Iverson, 17 Ala.
216, 223 (1850)). See generally W. ELLIOTT, supra note 18, § 17, at 32; J. ScHOULER, supra
note 44, § 8, at 6.
123. See Ex parte Mobile Light & R.R., 211 Ala. 525, 526, 101 So. 177, 178 (1924)
(court stated that liability of bailee would have to be based upon a contract "or upon a duty
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some cases, the very existence of a bailment transaction may be
implied by a court. 124
2. Duties Imposed by Contract: Extension and Limitation.-Parties to a lease, however, retain the flexibility to alter
such legally imposed obligations. A bailment transaction, as a contract, may be oral,12 cs implied,126 or express.127 In conjunction with
the obligations imposed by law, 128 the parties to a bailment are
generally subject to the principles of contract law. 129 Nevertheless,
the freedom to contract, though expansive/30 is not unlimited. 131
growing out of the relations created by such contract."). Likewise, a bailor's duty may exist
apart from the bailment contract. See Aircraft Sales & Serv. v. Gantt, 255 Ala. 508, 511, 52
So. 2d 388, 391 (1951) ("The liability is not to be determined by the contract alone, but is
rested on the bailor's duty beyond the contract.").
124. "A constructive bailment arises where a person having possession of a chattel
holds it under such circumstances that the law imposes upon him the obligation to deliver it
to another." Woodson v. Hare, 244 Ala. 301, 304, 13 So. 2d 172, 174 (1943) (court found
constructive bailment to exist pursuant to a quasi-contract where bailee, a minor, lacked
capacity to make contract). See generally W. HALE, supra note 108, § 12, at 43. Accord W.
HALE, supra note 108, § 2, at 17 ("[L]egal disability ... [is] to be used as a shield, and not
as a sword ... ; their disabilities relieve them from liability on their contracts, but not from
liability for their torts [such as conversion] .... [l]f they have come into possession of the
goods, they must restore them, if possible.").
125. See Metals, Inc. v. Jones, 468 So. 2d 154 (Ala. 1985); Romine Constr. Co. v. Ted
Warnke, Inc., 477 So. 2d 345 (Ala. 1985); Messer v. Southern Airways Sales Co., 246 Ala.
287, 20 So. 2d 585 (1945).
126. Kravitz v. Parking Serv. Co., 29 Ala. App. 523, 199 So. 727, cert. denied, 240 Ala.
467, 199 So. 731 (1940); Ex parte Mobile Light & R.R., 211 Ala. 525, 101 So. 177 (1924). See
Atmore Truckers Ass'n v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 219 F.2d 461, 464 (5th Cir. 1955) (warehouseman's acceptance of compensation, in excess of handling costs, was for storage, and
bailment relationship was therefore created).
127. See DeKalb Agresearch v. Abbott, 391 F. Supp. 152 (N.D. Ala. 1974), aff'd, 511
F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1975); Birmingham Television Corp. v. Water Works, 292 Ala. 147, 152,
290 So. 2d 636, 640 (1974) ("'It is axiomatic that in bailments, as in other contracts, there
must be a meeting of minds thereon and assent of both parties thereto; and a disclaimer of
liability can only become effective if brought to the bailor's knowledge.' ") (quoting Kravitz
v. Parking Serv. Co., 29 Ala. App. 523, 526, 199 So. 727, 729-30, cert. denied, 240 Ala. 467,
199 So. 731 (1940)); Goldstein v. Harris, 24 Ala. App. 3, 130 So. 313, cert. denied, 221 Ala.
612, 130 So. 315 (1930).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 106-24.
129. C{. Lloyd v. Service Corp. of Ala., 453 So. 2d 735, 741 (Ala. 1984) (exculpatory
clause in apartment lease ineffective where clause not bargained for and effect was unconscionable). See also supra note 127, and infra notes 131, 139 & 187-91 and accompanying
text.
130. The drafters of Article 2A have maintained an emphasis on freedom to contract.
U.C.C. § 2A-101 comment (1990) ("[T]he common law of leasing is dominated by the need
to preserve freedom of contract.") (commentary regarding the statutory analogue adopted
by Article 2A from Article 2).
131. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Service Corp. of Ala., 453 So. 2d 735 (Ala. 1984) (applying ALA.
ConE § 7-2-302 (1984) by analogy, court held exculpatory clause to be unconscionable and
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In Birmingham Television Corp. v. Water Works/82 for example, the court found that the question of whether the bailor had
actually accepted the terms of a warehouse receipt was sufficient to
withstand a motion for summary judgment.133 .The plaintiff/bailor
had deposited certain equipme.nt with the defendants for storage.134 The defendants gave the plaintiff warehouse receipts.
Printed on the reverse side o~ each receipt was a clause that limited the p~riod within which an action for damages could be
brought.135 The warehouse was flooded and the equipment damaged.136 After the time specified in the contract for bringing suit
had elapsed, the bailor sued to recover for damages.137 The trial
therefore ineffective); Wilson v. World Omni Leasing, Inc., 540 So. 2d 713 (Ala. 1989) (following Lloyd and holding that ALA. ConE § 7-2-302, governing unconscionability of
contracts, applies by analogy to lease agreements); Birmingham Television Corp. v. Water
Works, 292 Ala. 147, 290 So. 2d 636 (1974); Goldstein v. Harris, 24 Ala. App. 3, 130 So. 313
(validity of contract for bailment of fur coat that excluded bailee's liability for loss due to
fire was dependent on whether bailor fully assented to terms), cert. denied, 221 Ala. 612,
130 So. 315 (1930); see also supra note 21.
The rule allowing liability to be limited by special contract is applicable to both parties
to the bailment. Birmingham Television, 292 Ala. at 152, 290 So. 2d at 640; see W. HALE,
supra note 108, § 2, at 10-11, 27-28.
The freedom to contract and the applicability of Article 2A are also affected by this
State's version of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (U.C.C.C. or "Mini-Code") found at
ALA. CODE §§ 5-19-1 to -31 (1981 & Supp. 1990). The Mini-Code, a consumer protection
statute, governs consumer financing transactions, including consumer leases that would also
come within the scope of Article 2A. Nevertheless, when a transaction falls within Article
2A's analogue, as well as within the scope of other state statutory law-such as the U.C.C.C.
(the "Mini-Code")-"the other statutory law typically controls." WHITE & SuMMERS, supra
note 24, § 1-1, at 25. Presumably, a similar result would occur where a transaction involved
both Article 2A and the Mini-Code.
132. 292 Ala. 147, 290 So. 2d 636 (1974).
133. Birmingham Television, 292 Ala. at 151, 290 So. 2d at 639.
134. Id. at 149, 290 So. 2d at 637.
135. Id. The receipt stated in pertinent part:
NOTICE OF CLAIM AND FILING OF SUIT-Sec. 12
(b) No action may be maintained by the depositor or others against the warehouseman for loss or injury to the goods stored unless tinlely written claim has been
given • . . and unless such action is commenced either within nine months after date
of delivery by warehouseman or within nine months after depositor of record •.• is
notified that loss or injury to part or all of the goods has occurred, whichever time is
shorter.
Id. at 151, 290 So. 2d at 639.
136. Birmingham Television, 292 'Ala. at 151, 290 So. 2d at 639.
137. Id. at 151, 290 So. 2d at 639.
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court granted summary judgment for the defendant based upon
the running of the asserted limitation period, as reflected in the
exculpatory clause on the warehouse receipts. 138
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that, as long
as the terms were legal and not violative of public policy, parties to
a bailment could limit their liability. 139 The court, however, was
particularly concerned with ensuring that parties to a bailment actually assented to such limiting terms, 140 and therefore held that
an exculpatory clause is not enforceable unless the bailor knew of,
and actually agreed to, such terms. 141 Because a question existed as
to whether the bailor had knowledge of and actually assented to
such terms, summary judgment was reversed. 142
3. Miscellaneous Duties.-Alabama courts have primarily relied upon two sources when outlining the duties owed under a
"bailment for hire" relationship. First, courts have relied upon the
duties imposed by the common law to provide the general standard
of care owed by a bailee for hire. 143 Second, courts have looked to
the bailment contract itself in determining the extent to which the
transacting parties have limited or expanded their own obligations.144 The following brief survey of case law reveals that
Alabama courts have addressed certain recurring issues: (a) repair,
maintenance, and insurance; (b) contract construction and inter138. Id. at 152, 290 So. 2d at 640.
139. Id. Cf. Lloyd v. Service Corp. of Ala., 453 So. 2d 735 (Ala. 1984) (refusing to
enforce an unconscionable exculpatory clause in a residential lease contract that purported
to limit the bailor's liability), modified by Morgan v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 466 So. 2d
107, 117 (Ala. 1985) ("[A] more comprehensive rule ... is that exculpatory clauses affecting
the public interest are invalid. . . . Six criteria were established to identify the kind of agreement in which an exculpatory clause is invalid as contrary to public policy." (citation
omitted)). The Lloyd court stated that: "[E]nforcement of 'unbargained for' exculpatory
clauses in residential leases [is] against the best interests of the citizens of Alabama and
contrary to public policy." Lloyd, 453 So. 2d at 740. See generally W. HALE, supra note 108,
§ 2, at 28 (explaining limits on the parties' ability to enlarge or diminish liability by
contract).
140. See Birmingham Television, 292 Ala. at 152, 290 So. 2d at 640; see also supra
note 131 and accompanying text.
141. I d. ("'Such special provision in a contract of bailment limiting bailee's liability,
to be effective, must be known to, or brought to the notice of, the bailor, and be assented to
by him.'" (quoting Kravitz v. Parking Serv. Co., 29 Ala. App. 523, 525, 199 So. 727, 729,
cert. denied, 240 Ala. 467, 199 So. 731 (1940)) (emphasis supplied by Birmingham Television court)).
142. Birmingham Television, 292 Ala. at 154, 290 So. 2d at 642.
143. See supra notes 94 & 106-24 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 125-42 and accompanying text.
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pretation; and (c) contract termination and redelivery or
conversion of goods.
(a) Repair, Maintenance, and Insurance-Any bailee, including a bailee for hire, generally has a duty to conform to
contractual terms that address issues such as repair and maintenance,146 as well as use of the property in a particular manner. 146
At common law, a bailee is liable for any incidental and ordinary
expenses necessary for the care of the bailor's goods. 147· The bailee
is also liable for any extraordinary ·expenses occasioned by his negligent actions. 148 When the property is in need of repairs, the bailee
may have an obligation to cease using the property and to notify
the bailor of the need for repairs; or the bailee may make repairs
himself. 149 However, where a bailee voluntarily makes repairs, he is
under an obligation to make them i_n good faith.160
Although not required by law, the bailee may insure the bailed
property for the mutual beriefit of the parties to the transaction. 161
Where such insurance is purchased for the mutual benefit of the
parties, the bailee will likely be obligated to pay the fnsurance proceeds over to the bailor.162
(b) Contract Construction and Interpretation-A second
issue that has been 'addressed in Alabama is the construction and
interpretation of the bailment contract. When a bailment or lease
must be interpreted, courts apply accepted principles of construction to give .effect to the parties' intentions.163 In DeKalb
145. See Boss, supra note 22, at 101.
146. See Cartlidge v. Sloan, 124 Ala. '596, 26 So. 918 (1899).
147. W. ELLIO'IT, supra note 18, § 14, at 27.
148. Id. § 16, at 31.
.
149. See, e.g., Higman v. Camody, 112 Ala. 267, 20 So. 480 (1895).
150. See W. HALE, supra note 108, § 2, at 28-30; W. ELLIO'IT, supr:a note 18, § 17. See
also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reeves, 440 So. 2d 1086 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983) (bailee denied recovery for repairs made to bailed property where repairs were not made in good faith).
151. Goldstein v. Harris, 24 Ala. App. 3, 130 So. 3~3, cert. denied, 221 Ala. 612, 130
So. 315 (1930).
152. Goldstein, 24 Ala. App. at 4, 130 So. at 314 (court held that insurance proceeds
were held in trust by bailee for bailor where bailed fur coat was damaged by fire).
153. See, e.g., DeKalb Agresearch v. Abbott, 391 F. Supp. 152, 153-54 (N.D. Ala. 1974)
(transaction determined to be a lease and not a sale was "not covered by the Uniform Commercial Code, and is therefore, dependent upon the common law and the law of contracts
for its construction and effect" (footnote omitted)), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1975); see
also Learned-Letcher Lumber Co. v. Fowler, 109 Ala. 169, 19 So. 396 (1895) (not error to
admit parol evidence where controversy depended on construction of the writings).
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Agresearch v. Abbott,1154 for instance, the court evaluated the defendant's claim of breach of express and implied warranties in
light of the fact that the parties had reduced their agreement to a
written document. The court held that, in a bailment or lease, the
contract will control with regard to claims for breach of warranty if
the parties' obligations are clearly and unambiguously addressed.11515 Therefore, where parties have reduced their agreement
to writing, the document will control the court's construction and
interpretation, in the absence of mistake or fraud. 1156
(c) Contract Termination and Redelivery or Conversion of
Goods-Alabama case law has also addressed issues regarding the
termination of the bailment contract, the bailee's obligation to redeliver the bailed goods, and the bailee's liability for conversion.
Return of the property is generally an express or implied element
in every common law bailment. 1157 At the bailment's termination,
the bailee must redeliver the property over to the bailor even if the
bailee becomes bankrupt while in possession of the property.u18 In
fact, a bailor may establish a prima facie case of bailee's negligence
if the bailee did not, upon demand, either return the property or
explain his failure to do so. 1159 A bailee may additionally be presumed negligent where the goods are lost, 160 unless the loss was
caused by the violence of nature. 161 The bailee may also be liable
for conversion of goods where he wrongfully delivered the property
to someone else.162 However, a bailee will generally not be liable to
the true owner if the bailee in good faith delivered the property to
154. 391 F. Supp. 152 (N.D. Ala. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1975).
155. DeKalb, 391 F. Supp. at 154.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., In re Sitkin Smelting & Refining, 639 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981)
(in determining whether transaction was bailment or sale, stated that one test of bailment is
whether option was retained to direct the return or sale of goods); W. ELLIOTT, supra note
18, § 20, at 36; W. HALE, supra note 108, § 2, at 30-35.
158. In re Sitkin Smelting & Refining, 639 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (court
held that bailor's claim to property was superior to claims of bailee's secured creditors
where transaction was deemed to be bailment rather than sale); see also Boss, supra note
22, at 99-100 n.285.
159. See Dixie Drive It Yourself Sys., Mobile Co. v. Hames, 34 Ala. App. 619, 43 So.
2d 140, cert. denied, 253 Ala. 132,43 So. 2d 143 (1949); Anniston Lincoln-Mercury v. Mayse,
341 So. 2d 949 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977).
160. See Ridgely Operating Co. v. White, 227 Ala. 459, 150 So. 693 (1933).
161. See Lauderdale County Coop. v. Lansdell, 263 Ala. 557, 83 So. 2d 201 (1955).
162. See Pope & Co. v. Union Warehouse Co., 195 Ala. 309, 70 So. 159 (1915); infra
note 172.
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the bailor before notification that the true owner would look to
him for the property. 163
.
The bailee is also obliged to use the property in accordance
with the authority given to him. Use by the bailee beyond this authority will likely constitute a conversion of the property for which
the bailee would be liable. 164 In Jones v. Americar/65 the Supreme
Court of Alabama addressed the issue of a lessee's conversion of
certain personal property retained under a lease agreement.166 A
lessor of automobiles pursuant to a franchise agreement claimed
that the lessee had become delinquent on payments.167 The lessee
subsequently cancelled the contract, and the lessor brought an action seeking damages for conversion of twenty-nine automobiles
and for breach of contract.16s The court recognized the traditional
definition of conversion: Conversion occurs when a party appropriates a thing for his own use and enjoyment, or destroys or exercises
dominion over property against the owner's claim of title. 169
Conversion may also result where:
The bailee attempts an
assignment contrary to the terms of the bailment contract,170 (2)
the bailee sells the goods without express authority/71 or J3) the
bailee wrongfully delivers the property to a third-party claill)ing to
be the true bailor.172 Liability for conversion may also arise where

n>

163. See Birmingham Loan Co. v. Klinner, 39 Ala. App. 125, 95 So. 2d 402 (1957).
164. Cartlidge v. Sloan, 124 Ala. 596, 602, 26 So. 918, 920 (1899) ("The general rule is
that if a bailee, having authority to use a chattel in a particular way, uses it in a different
way, or to a greater extent than authorized, such unauthorized use is a conversion of the
chattel •••. "); see also W. ELLIOTT, supra note 18, § 13; W. HALE, supra note 108, § 2, at 29
(quoting Cartlidge, 124 Ala. at 602, 26 So. 2d at 920).
165. 283 Ala. 638, 219 So. 2d 893 (1969).
166. The court held that evidence supported a verdict for the lessor on the lessee's
conversion but, nevertheless, reversed on other grounds. The court defined "conversion as
consisting in .•. 'the appropriation of the thing to the ·party's own use and beneficial enjoyment, or in its destruction, or in exercising of dominion over it, in exclusion or defiance of
the plaintiff's right, or in withholding the possession from the plaintiff, under a claim of title
inconsistent with his own.'" Jones, 283 Ala. at 647, 219 So. 2d at 900-01 (quoting Geneva
Gin and Storage Co. v. Rawls, 240 Ala. 320, 322, 199 So. 734, 735 (1940)).
167. Id. at 641, 219 So. 2d at 895.
168. !d. at 642, 219 So. 2d at 895.
169. Id. at 647, 219 So. 2d at 900-01.
170. See Gwin v. Emerald Co., 201 Ala. 384, 386, 78 So. 758, 760 (1918) ("Any attempted assignment, contrary to the terms of the bailment, is a conversion •.•.").
171. See Calhoun v. Thompson, 56 Ala. 166, 169 (1876) (unauthorized delivery of
horse in violation of terms of the bailment amounted to conversion}.
172. See Pope & Co. v. Union Warehouse Co., 195 Ala. 309, 70 So. 159 (1915) (bailee
who turned cotton bales over to third party was liable to true owner for conversion). The

Alabama Law Review

130

[Vol. 42:1:101

the bailee's agents negligently dispose of the property. 173 Finally,
where conversion results from a bailee's failure to exercise the degree of diligence as required under the circumstances, he may be
liable for the full value of the property if it was rendered
worthless. 174

III.

THE ALABAMA ARTICLE 2A PROJECT

Given the foregoing description of the current state of personal property lease law in Alabama, it seems appropriate to
describe, in general terms, the impact that Article 2A will likely
have on this area of the commercial law in our state. A section-bysection analysis of the new act, however, would be impractical for
several reasons. First, comprehensive and accessible overviews of
the proposed statute have been published elsewhere; 1715 second, Article 2A is based, to a considerable extent, on Article 2 of the Code,
and there is no dearth of authority treating recurring Article 2 issues in Alabama/76 as well as commentary treating the essential
similarity of Article 2A to its statutory analogue. 177 Furthermore,
the practitioner would be better aided by a discussion of both the
scope and tenor of the deliberations by the Alabama Committee, as
well as by a discussion of specific issues of particular interest to
attorneys in the state.
Pope court noted, however, that "the rule of liability would be otherwise if the bailee were
induced to surrender the chattel by some plausible deception practiced upon him by the
pseudo-bailor." Id. at 311, 70 So. at 160.
173. See Allen v. Jacob Dold Packing Co., 204 Ala. 652, 655, 86 So. 525, 528 (1920)
(Bailee's agents negligently filled third party's meat order by taking meat owned by, and
stored for, plaintiff; such appropriation by the bailee resulted in an unlawful interference of
plaintiff's "use, enjoyment, or dominion over it[s property] ... as to be a conversion.").
174. See Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Casualty Co. v. Lyle Serv. Ambulance-Wrecker,
395 So. 2d 90, 92 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981) (citing Howell v. Dodd, 229 Ala. 393, 157 So. 211
(1934)) (bailee has no legal right to withhold property from the holder of legal title).
175. See Bayer, Personal Property Leasing: Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 43 Bus. LAW. 1491 (1988); Flick, Article 2A-Leases, 44 Bus. LAW. 1501 (1989); SYMPOSIUM, supra note 5; see generally 2 P. ALcES, N. HANSFORD, P. LACY & R. ANZMNO,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TRANSACTION GUIDE ch. 11 (1988) (written by Edwin E. Huddleson, III).
176. See, e.g., Roszkowski, Contract Modification and the Statute of Frauds: Making
Sense of Section 2-209 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 36 ALA. L. REv. 51 (1984); Note,

United States v. West Side Bank: Expanding the Seller's Right to Reclaim Under Section
2-702 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 40 ALA. L. REv. 283 (1988).
177. See Alces, Personal Property Leasing: Proposed Article 2A of the U.C.C., in 2
NEW YORK PRACTICE GUIDE BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL§§ 19.01- 19.03 (E. Lach ed. 1990).
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This section of the Article will, therefore, describe briefly the
contours of the debate attending the promulgation of Article 2A in
Alabama, and consider specific ·provisions under consideration by
the Alabama Committee. As a prefatory matter, it must be emphasized that, at the time of this writing, the work of the Alabama
Committee was not yet finished. But now is the time to apprise
Alabama practitioners regarding the course of our deliberations.
The Alabama Law Review Article 2A Symposium178 was published shortly after the promulgation of Uniform Article 2A.179 The
Symposium included both contributions from attorneys who had
been directly involved in the drafting of Article 2A,180 and contributions from attorneys who, although not involved in the drafting,
maintained an interest in the commercial law and were concerned
with adjustments to the Uniform Commercial Code. It is fair to
state that the general conclusion of the participants was that Article 2A should be enacted, but only after changes had been made to
both the text and comments of the Uniform Act. 181 .
Largely as a response to the inadequacies of the tmiform version identified in the Alabama Law Review Article 2A Symposium,
Donald Rapson and Robert Haydock, members of the Permanent
Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, and Harry Sigman, a California practitioner and past chairman of the Uniform
Commercial Code Committee of that state's bar, developed a set of
uniform amendments for Article 2A. That set of revisions came to
be known as the "California/Massachusetts" version of the Act
("Cal/Mass Amendments"). They treated generally three areas:
Priority of claims to lease property; lessor and lessee damages; and
provisions for consumer protection.182
In December 1990, in response to the Cal/Mass Amendments,
the A.L.I. and N.C.C.U.S.L. promulgated a draft of certain uniform
178. SYMPOSIUM, supra note 5.
179. Article 2A was promulgated in 1987. U.C.C. art. 2A foreword (1989).
180. Marion W. Benfield, Jr., and Frederick H. Miller were members of the Article 2A
drafting committee. U.C.C. art. 2A drafting committee members (1989).
181. Homer Kripke foresaw problems with Article 2A. In fact, he stated he would have
voted against the Article. Kripke, Some Dissonant Notes About Article 2A, 39 ALA. L. REv.
791, 801 (1988).
.
182. AB Edwin E. Huddleson, m, recognized in his 1990 supplement :to the UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE TRANSACTION GUIDE, two versions of Article 2A exist: "[T]he official 'uniform' version and the Massachusetts/California version." 2 P. ALcEs, N. HANsFORD, P. LAcY
& R .ANzlVlNO, supra note 175, § 11:04 (Supp. 1990)~
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amendments to Article 2A ("Uniform Amendments"). These 1990
uniform revisions have now been circulated to the various states
for their consideration. The Uniform Amendments are based upon
the Cal/Mass Amendments, but do not incorporate consumer protections to the same extent as the Cal/Mass Amendments. 183 The
Alabama Committee considered first the Cal/Mass Amendments
and then, most recently, the 1990 Uniform Amendments. The proposed Alabama draft of Article 2A represents a combination of
these two amendment formulations, as well as nonuniform amendments developed by the Alabama Committee in response to the
perceived personal property leasing needs of this state.
The Alabama Committee has endeavored to consider each provision of the Uniform Act, not just in terms of the tensions
identified between the original Uniform Act, the 1990 Uniform
Amendments, and the Cal/Mass version, but more importantly, in
terms of the particular needs and interests of Alabama's commercial jurisprudence. The following sections of this Article will
highlight several of the more controversial issues raised with regard to particular provisions of the Uniform Act and will describe,
in general terms, the scope of the deliberations by the Alabama
Committee with regard to these issues. To aid such presentation,
both the uniform version of particular provisions and the current
draft of the Alabama version of those same provisions ("Alabama
Draft Proposal") will be compared and discussed.

A.

"Finance Leases"

A finance lease transaction contemplates three parties: the
supplier of certain goods (seller); the lessor of the goods (buyer);
and the lessee of the goods (user). From the perspective of the
lessee, the transaction may closely resemble a sale made by the
supplier and financed by the financing lessor. The supplier is responsible for the fitness of the goods, and the lessor generally
serves only a financing function. Given such a relationship among
the parties, it makes good commercial sense to recognize the true
posture of the parties and provide the lessee limited recourse
against the financing lessor, thereby requiring the lessee to look to
the supplier with regard to the fitness of the goods.
183. See infra notes 245-52 and accompanying text.
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The original uniform definition pf a "finance lease" is contained in Section 2A-103(1)(g):
§ 2A-103. Definitions and Index of Definitions.

(1) In this Article unless the context otherwise requires:
(g) "Finance lease" means a lease in which (i) the lessor
does not select, manufacture or supply the goods, (ii)
the lessor acquires the goods or the right to possession and use of the goods in connection with the
lease, and (iii) either the lessee receives a copy of the
contract evidencing the lessor's purchase of the goods
on or before signing the lease contract, or the lessee's
approval of the contract evidencing the lessor's
purchase of the goods is a condition to effectiveness
of the lease contract.184 •

The current draft of the Alabama version incorporates the 1990
Uniform Amendment and defines finance lease as follows:
§ 7-2A-103. DEFINITIONS AND INDEX OF DEFINITIONS.

(1) In this Article unless the context otherwise requires:
(g) "Finance lease" means a lease with respect to which:
(i) the lessor does not select, manufacture, or supply
the goods; (ii) the lessor acquires the goods or the
right to possession and use of the goods in connection
with the lease; and (iii) one of the following occurs:
(A) the lessee receives a copy of the contract by which
the lessor acquired the goods or the right to possession and use of the goods before signing the lease
contract; (B) the lessee's approval of the contract by
which the lessor acquired the goods or the right to
possession and use of the goods is a condition to effectiveness of the lease contract; (C) the lessee, before
signing the lease contract, receives an accurate and
complete statement designating the promises and
warranties, and any disclaimers of warranties, limitations or modifications of remedies, or liquidated
damages, including those of a third party, such as the
manufacturer of the goods, provided to the lessor by
the person supplying the goods in connection with or
184. U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(g) (1989).
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as part of the contract by which the lessor acquired
the goods or the right to possession and use of the
goods; or (D) if the lease is not a consumer lease, the
lessor, before the lessee signs the lease contract, informs the lessee in writing (a) of the identity of the
person supplying the goods to the lessor, unless the
lessee has selected that person and directed the lessor
to acquire the goods or the right to possession and
use of the goods from that person, (b) that the lessee
is entitled under this Article to the promises and warranties, including those of any third party, provided
to the lessor by the person supplying the goods in
connection with or as part of the contract by which
the lessor acquired the goods or the right to possession and use of the goods, and (c) that the lessee may
communicate with the person supplying the goods to
the lessor and receive an accurate and complete statement of those promises and warranties, including any
disclaimers and limitations of them or of remedies. 185

The difference between the two versions was suggested by the Cal/
Mass Amendments. 186 The current version, as incorporated by the
Alabama Draft Proposal, is designed to better serve principles of
freedom of contract that are fundamental to the commercial law.
The parties need not cast their agreement in terms of any
magic words. The current version would recognize the finance lease
incidents of the transaction so long as the lessor discloses all warranties, along with disclaimers and limitations, provided by the
lessor and suppli~r. Moreover, in nonconsumer leases/s7 the lessor
may assure finance lease treatment by simply informing the lessee
185. DRAFT ALA. CODE § 7-2A-103(1)(g) (1990); U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(g) & comment (g)
(1990); see generally U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37) (1989) and U.C.C. 2A-103(1)(j) & comment (j)
(1990) ("create a sharper distinction .... [and] a clearer signal ... [regarding true leases
and] disguised secured transactions"). See also M. RICE, EQUIPMENT FINANCING 62-71 (1981)

("disguised secured transactions").
186. Report of the Uniform Commercial Code Committee of the Business Law Section on Proposed California Commercial Code Division 10 (Article 2A), 39 ALA. L. REv. 979,
996-97, 1006-08 (1988) (Senate Bill 1580, as amended December 1, 1987) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA REPORT).
187. "Consumer Lease" is defined as follows:
[A] lease that a lessor regularly engaged in the business of leasing or selling makes to
a lessee, except an organization, who takes under the lease primarily for a personal,
family, or household purpose, if the total payments to be made under the lease contract, excluding payments for options to renew or buy, do not exceed $100,000.
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of the supplier's identity, and by apprising the. lessee that he may
have rights against the supplier under the terms of the purchase
contract executed by the supplier and the lessor.

B.

Unconscionability

In commercial law the concept of unconscionability has been
problematic. 188 Perhaps it is best to simply consider the unconscionability provision of Article 2 of the Alabama Commercial Code189
as something of a statutory waste dump into which all the hard
cases have been deposited in an attempt to avoid making bad law.
The drafters of 1\rticle 2A proposed a version of the unconscionability provision that departs from the formulation of its Sales
analogue:
§ 2A-108. :Unconscionability.
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds a lease contract or any

clause of a lease contract to have been unconscionable at the time it
was made the court may refuse to enforce the lease contract, or it
may enforce the remainder of the lease contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) With respect to a consumer lease, if the court as a matter of
law finds tl].at a lease contract or any clause of a lease contract has
been induced by unconscionable conduct or that unconscionable
conduct has occurred in the collection of a claim arising from a lease
contract, the court may grant appropriate relief.
(3) Before making a finding of unconscionability under subsection (1) or (2), the court, on its own motion or that of a party, shall
afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to
the setting, purpose, and effect of the lease contract or clause
thereof, or of the conduct.
(4) In an action in which the lessee claims unconscionability
with respect to a consumer lease:
DRAFT ALA. CoDE § 7-2A-103(1)(e) (1990), incorporating-verbatim U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(e)
(1990) (Uniform version does not recommend any particular dollar amount; Alabama Com-

mittee recommends the amount as noted}.
188. See P. ALcEs, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANsACTIONS 1I 3.07 (1989). But see Leff,
Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485
(1967} (attack on U.C.C. § 2-302}; see also Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78
YALE L.J. 757 (1969) (response to the Leff conclusion).
189. ALA. CODE § 7-2-302 (1984).
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(a) If the court finds unconscionability under subsection
(1) or (2), the court shall award reasonable attorney's
fees to the lessee.
(b) If the court does not find unconscionability and the
lessee claiming unconscionability has brought or
maintained an action he [or she] knew to be groundless, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees
to the party against whom the claim is made.
(c) In determining attorney's fees, the amount of therecovery on behalf of the claimant under subsections
(1) and (2) is not controlling.190

Contrast the above uniform formulation with the current draft of
Alabama section 7-2A-108:
§ 7-2A-108. UNCONSCIONABILITY.

(1) If the court as a matter of law finds a lease contract or any
clause of a lease contract to have been unconscionable at the time it
was made the court may refuse to enforce the lease contract, or it
may enforce the remainder of the lease contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) Before making a finding of unconscionability under subsection (1), the court, on its own motion or that of a party, shall afford
the parties a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to the
setting, purpose, and effect of the lease contract or clause thereof, or
of the conduct.191

There is a symbiotic relationship between the commercial
fraud law and unconscionability principles. 192 The Alabama Committee has recognized this symbiotic relationship and has deleted
190. U.C.C. § 2A-108 (1990).
191. DRAFT ALA. CooE § 7-2A-108 (1990).
192. See Drewry v. Drewry, 8 Va. App. 460,466, 383 S.E.2d 12, 18 (1989) (court found

husband had exerted undue influence in securing spouse's waiver of support-action for
unconscionability may be broader that an action for fraud: "A party may be free of fraud
but guilty of overreaching or oppressive conduct in securing the agreement which is so patently unfair that courts of equity may refuse to enforce it."); see generally Mallor,
Unconscionability in Contracts Between Merchants, 40 Sw. L.J. 1065, 1072 (1986) ("Most
judges and commentators agree that an unconscionability determination involves the evaluation of two distinct but interrelated matters: how the parties arrived at the terms, and the
justifiability of the terms themselves .... Given its concern for reality of consent, the procedural aspect of unconscionability overlaps with the traditional contract doctrines regarding
the formation of a contract and those that police agreements for fraud, duress, and the
like."). Mallor at 1072 (footnotes omitted).
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subsections (2) and (4) of the Uniform Act. The decision to delete
these two uniform subsections is the product of the conclusion that
the common law193 and statutory194 fraud theories of recovery
available in Alabama provide s~cient protection to those who
may be the victims of insidious overreaching.
193. See Transport Acceptance Corp. v. Vincent, 521 So. 2d 976, 979 (Ala. 1988);
Sharp Elec. Corp. v. Shaw, 524 So. 2d 586, 592 (Ala. 1987); Boswell v. Coker, 519 So. 2d 493,
495 (Ala. 1987); Continental Elec. Co. v. American Employers' Ins., 518 So. 2d 83, 88 (Ala.
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1023 (1988); Coleman v. Gulf Life Ins., 514 So. 2d 944, 946
(Ala. 1987}.
194. ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-100 to -104 (1975) provide as follows:
§ 6-5-100.

FRAUD-

RIGHT OF ACTION GENERALLY•.

Fraud by one, accompanied with damage to the party defrauded, in all cases
gives a right of action.
§ 6-5-101. SAME -

MISREPRESENTATIONS OF

MATERIAL

FACTS.

Misrepresentations of a material fact made willfully to deceive, or recklessly
without knowledge, and acted on by the opposite party, or if made by mistake and
innocently and acted on by the opposite party, constitute legal fraud.
§ 6-5-102. SUPPRESSION OF MATERIAL FACTS.

Suppression of a material fact which the party is under an obligation to communicate constitutes fraud. The obligation to communicate may arise from the
confidential relations of the parties or from the particular circumstances of the case.
§ 6-5-103. DECEIT- RIGHT OF ACTION GENERALLY.

Willful misrepresentation of a material fact made to induce another to act, and
upon which he does act to his injury, will give a right of action. Mere concealment of
such a fact, unless done in such a manner as to deceive and mislead, will not support
an action. In all cases of deceit, knowledge of a falsehood constitutes an essential
element. A fraudulent or reckless representation of facts as true, which the party may
not know to be false, if intended to deceive, is equivalent to a knowledge of the
falsehood.
§ 6·5-104. SAME -

FRAUDULENT

DECEIT.

(a) One who willfully deceives another with intent to induce him to alter his
position to his injury or risk is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers.
(b) A deceit within the meaning of this section is either:
(1) The suggestion as a fact of that which is not true by one who does not
believe it to be true;
(2) The assertion as a fact of that which is not true by one who has no
reasonable ground for believing it to be true;
(3} The suppression of a fact by one who is bound to disclose it or who
gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead for want of communication of that fact; or
(4) A promise made without any intention of performing it.

Alabama Law Review

138

[Vol. 42:1:101

C. Modifications of Contracts and Statute of Frauds
Requirements
The common law "pre-existing duty" rule1·95 proved unworkable in the commercial law. Section 2-209196 of the uniform sales
law is designed to replace the formalistic and fictional "consideration" basis of the common law rule with a provision that considers
business realities as well as the dangers of commercial fraud and
extortion attending modification of commercial contracts. 197
Under both Alabama section 7-2-209198 and draft section 7-2A208,199 an attempted modification that fails to satisfy the statutory
or contractual requirements may still be effective as a waiver. 200
With regard to the impact of the statute of frauds upon the contract as modified, compare uniform section 2A-208 and the extant
Alabama draft of the same provision:
§ 2A-208. Modification, Rescission and Waiver.

(1) An agreement modifying a lease contract needs no consider~
ation to be binding.
(2) A signed lease agreement that excludes modification or re~
scission except by a signed writing may not be otherwise modified or
rescinded, but, except as between merchants, such a requirement on
a form supplied by a merchant must be separately signed by the
other party.
(3) Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not
satisfy the requirements of subsection (2), it may operate as a
waiver.
(4) A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of a lease contract may retract the waiver by reasonable
notification received by the other party that strict performance will
be required of any term waived, unless the retraction would be unjust in view of a material change of position in reliance on the
waiver.201
195. The "pre-existing duty" rule is based on the premise that if a party presently
owes a duty under contract, additional consideration is necessary to modify that duty. See
Griffin v. Hardin, 456 So. 2d 1113, 1116 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (promise to do what one is
already under legal obligation to do is not sufficient consideration for another contract).
196.
§ 2-209 (1989).
197. Id. § 2-209 comment 1.
198. ALA. CODE § 7-2-209 (1984).
199. DRAFT ALA. CoDE § 7-2A-208 (1990).
200. ALA. CoDE § 7-2-209(4) (1984); DRAFT ALA. CoDE § 7-2A-208(4) (1990).
201. U.C.C. § 2A-208 (1990).

u.c.c.
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Compare the draft Alabama version, section 7-2A-208:
§ 7-2A-208. MODIFICATION, RESCISSION, AND WAIVER.
(1) An agreement modifying a lease contract needs no consider,
ation to be binding.
(2) A signed lease agreement that excludes modification or re- ·
scission except by a signed writing may not be otherwise modified or
rescinded, but, except as between merchants, such a requirement on
a form supplied by a merchant must be separately signed by the
other party.
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this Article (Section 7-2A-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified
is within its provisions.
.
(4) Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not
satisfy the requirements of subsection (2), it may operate as a
wru.ver.
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting a executory portion
of a lease contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notification
received by the other party that strict performance will be required
of any term waived, unless the retraction would be unjust in view of
a material change of position in reliance on the waiver.202

The statute of frauds provision of section 7-2A-208(3) was incorporated into the Alabama draft because .the reasons offered for
its exclusion in the official comment to the uniform act were not
convincing.203 · "The commercial community's interest in certainty
would [be] better served by clearly providing that a modification
would have to satisfy the" 204 writing requirement provided in section 7-2A-201, rather than by leaving this issue to ad hoc
resolution by the courts of this state.·

D.

Warranty of Quiet Possession

The Alabama version of section 2A-211 tracks exactly the language of the uniform act:
§ 7-2A-211. WARRANTIES AGAINST INTERFERENCE AND
AGAINST
INFRINGEMENT;
LESSEE'S.
OBLIGATION
AGAINST INFRINGEMENT.
,202. DRAFT ALA. CODE § 7-2A-208 (1990).
203. DRAFT ALA. CoDE§ 7-2A.:208 Alabama comment (1990).
204. Id.
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(1) There is in a lease contract a warranty that for the lease
term no person holds a claim to or interest in the goods that arose
from an act or omission of the lessor, other than a claim by way of
infringement or the like, which will interfere with the lessee's enjoyment of its leasehold interest.
(2) Except in a finance lease there is in a lease contract by a
lessor who is a merchant regularly dealing in goods of the kind a
warranty that the goods are delivered free of the rightful claim of
any person by way of infringement or the like.
(3) A lessee who furnishes specifications to a lessor or a supplier
shall hold the lessor and the supplier harmless against any claim by
way of infringement or the like that arises out of compliance with
the specifi.cations.206

However, it is not the language of the section but rather the
language of its official comment that has caused the Committee
some problem. In pertinent part, the official comment explains
that "[t]he warranty of quiet possession was abolished with respect
to sales of goods. " 206 In the draft Alabama comment, the Committee takes issue with such statement in that:
In Alabama, it is not clear that the warranty of quiet enjoyment was
so much abolished in the Sales article as it was subsumed in the
broad language of section 7-2-312... . The express inclusion of the
warranty of quiet enjoyment in this provision does not imply that
there is no such warranty in the Sales analogue. 207

While the Alabama Committee recognized the potential inconsistency between the sales and lease law, adjustment of the sales
commentary to reflect the conclusion that the warranty of quiet
possession is alive and well in Alabama sales transactions would be
beyond the charge of the Alabama Article 2A Committee. The reference to the sales analogue in the lease provision comment should
suffice.
205. DRAFT ALA. CODE § 7-2A-211 (1990); u.c.c. § 2A-211 (1990).
206. U.C.C. § 2A-211 comment (1990) (citing U.C.C. § 2-312 comment 1 (1989)).
207. DRAFT ALA. CODE§ 7-2A-211 Alabama comment (1990). The committee cites City
Car Sales v. McAlpin, 380 So. 2d 865, 867 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979), cert. denied, 380 So. 2d 869
(Ala. 1980), in which the court refers to the official comment to section 7-2-312. That comment provides that disturbance of quiet possession is evidence of the breach of the warranty
of title.
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E. Disclaimer of Warranties
Perhaps no area of the commercial law -is of greater or more
frequent concern to both general practitioners aJ;J.d commercial law
specialists than warranties and warranty disclailners. The implied
warranties of the sales law go to the very foundations of the parties' deal.208 These warranties vindicate the transactors'
expectations, and are likely to be the focus of litigation concerning
the parties' performance of, and conformity with, the terms- of
their contract. Insofar as leases contemplate an allocation of property rights not wholly distinct from-the division of property rights
recognized in the sale of goods,209 Article 2A contains both express
and implied warranty provisions that similarly establish the contours of the lessor's and lessee's undertaking. And just as the
consideration of warranties is fundamental to th~ lease transaction,
the disclaimer of warranties concomitantly impacts the lessor/
lessee relationship.
The Alabama draft version of section 2A-214, "Exclusion or
Modification of Warranties," departs from the uniform version.
The uniform version provides:
§ 2A-214. Exclusion or Modification of Warranties.

(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit a warranty
must be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each'
other; but, subject to the provisions of Section 7-2A-202 on parol or
extrinsic evidence, negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent
that the construction is unreasonable.
·
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied
warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language 'must
208. U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 4 (1989) ("[T]he whole purpose of the law of warranty is

to determine what it is that the seller has in essence agreed to sell • • . . [l]n determining
what [the parties] have agreed upon[,] good faith is a factor and consideration should be
given to the fact that the probability is small that a real price is intended to be exchanged
for a pseudo-obligation.").
209. See Wilson v. World Omni Leasing, 540 So. 2d 713 (Ala. 1989); W.E. Johnson
Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, 238 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1~70); Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp.,
244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968) (Article 2 applies to lease agreements). But see Briscoe's
Foodland v. Capital Assocs., 502 So. 2d 619 (Miss. 1986); United States Armament Corp. v.
Charlie Thomas Leasing Co., 661 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); Mays v. Citizens & S.
Nat'l Bank, 132 Ga. App. 602, 208 S.E.2d 614 (1974), overruled on ·other grounds, Mock v.
Canterbury Realty Co., 152 Ga. App. 872, 264 S.E.2d 489 (1980) (leases not covered by
Article 2).
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mention "merchantability", be by a writing, and be conspicuous.
Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if
it is in writing, is conspicuous and states, for example, "There is no
warranty that the goods will be fit for a particular purpose."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2), but subject to subsection
(4),

unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded by expressions like "as
is," or "with all faults," or by other language that in
common understanding calls the lessee's attention to
the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that
there is no implied warranty, if in writing and
conspicuous;
(b) if the lessee before entering into the lease contract
has examined the goods or the sample or model as
fully as desired or has refused to examine the goods,
there is no implied warranty with regard to defects
that an examination ought in the circumstances to
have revealed; and
(c) an implied warranty may also be excluded or modified by course of dealing, course of performance, or
usage of trade.
(a)

(4) To exclude or modify a warranty against interference or
against infringement (Section 2A-211) or any part of it, the language
must be specific, be by a writing, and be conspicuous, unless the
circumstances, including course of performance, course of dealing, or
usage of trade, give the lessee reason to know that the goods are
being leased subject to a claim or interest of any person. 210

Compare the above uniform version with its draft Alabama
counterpart:
7-2A-214. EXCLUSION OR MODIFICATION OF
WARRANTIES.
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit a warranty
must be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each
other; but, subject to the provisions of Section 7 -2A-202 on parol or
extrinsic evidence, negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent
that the construction is unreasonable.
(2) Subject to subsection (3):
§

210. U.C.C. § 2A-214 (1990).
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(a) to exclude or modify the implied warranty of
merchantability or any part of it the language must
mention merchantability, be by a writing,. and be conspicuous. Language to. exclude the implied warranty
of merchantability is sufficient if it is in writing, is
conspicuous and states, for example, "There is no
warranty that the goods will be merchantable".
(b) to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness
the exclusion must be by a writing and be conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of
fitness is sufficient if it is in writ4lg, is conspicuous
and states, for example, "There is no warranty that
the goods will be fit for a particular purpose."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2), but subject to subsection
(4),

(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded by expressions like "as
is,'.' or "with all faults," or by other language that in
common understanding calls the lessee's attention to
the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that
there is no implied warranty, if in writing and
conspicuous;
(b) if the lessee before entering into the· lease contract
has examined the goods or the sample or model as
fully as desired or has refused to examine the goods,
there is no implied warranty with regard to defects
that an examination 'ought in the circumstances to
have revealed; and
(c) an implied warranty may also be excluded or modified by course of dealing, course of performance, or
usage of trade.
I

(4) To exclude or modify a warranty against interference or
against infringement (Section 7-2A-211) or any part of it, the language must be specific, be by a writing, and be conspicuous, unless
the circumstances, including course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade, give the lessee reason to know that the goods
are being leased subject to a claim or interest of any pers~n.
(5) Nothing in subsection (2) or subsection (3)(a) or in Section
7-2A-215 shall be construed so as to limit or exclude the lessor's lia-
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bility for damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer
goods. 211

The Committee's intention is that the Alabama version be understood as departing formally rather than substantively from the
uniform act. The design of the Alabama departures from the uniform formulation is to provide transactors better guidance with
regard to the drafting of effective disclaimers. Further, Article 2A
should be construed in a manner consistent with the law that has
been derived from the Sales analogue. For example, the decision by
the Supreme Court of Alabama in Gaylord v. Lawler Mobile
Homes,212 that "as is," "with all faults," and "as they stand" disclaimers will be ineffective in sales of new goods, should apply as
well to the lease of new goods once Article 2A is enacted in Alabama. Finally, the inclusion of nonuniform subsection (5) brings
this section of the proposed lease law into conformity with the parallel Alabama sales provision.
F.

Third-Party Beneficiaries of Warranties

Intimately related to the issue of what warranty protections
are afforded the lessee are questions concerning the scope of persons and interests protected by express and implied warranties.
What renders these issues particularly problematic is the parallel
development of products liability law as the tort response to
breach of warranty claims for injuries sustained by remote parties.213 The uniform version of section 2A-216, "Third-Party
Beneficiaries of Express and Implied Warranties," 214 and its Alabama draft variation represent efforts to maintain the delicate
balance between these parallel jurisprudential paths. As with the
Sales Article, the Lease Article provides three alternative formulations of the third-party beneficiary provision. And just as Alabama
211. DRAFT ALA. CODE § 7-2A-214 (1990).
212. 477 So. 2d 382 (Ala. 1985).
213. According to Professor Prosser, a third party beneficiary, as if standing in the
shoes of the purchaser, can sue for breach of warranty. W. KEEToN, D. DoBBS, R. KEEToN &
D. OWENS, PROSSER AND KEEToN ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 95A (5th ed. 1984). Section 2-318
of the uniform commercial law presents three alternatives for third party beneficiaries of
warranties. Alternative A limits the beneficiaries to "family, household and guests of the
purchaser." Alternatives B and C further expand the class of beneficiaries. U.C.C. § 2-318
comment 3 (1989).
214. U.C.C. § 2A-216 (1990).
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has selected Alternative Bin the sales law,21G the draft Lease Article chooses Alternative B as follows: 216
§ 2A-216. Third-Party Beneficiaries of Express and Implied
Warranties.

ALTERNATIVE A
A warranty to or for the benefit of a lessee under this Article,
whether express or implied, extends to any natural person who is in
the family or household of the lessee or who is a guest in the lessee's
home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume, or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by
breach of the warranty. This section does not displace principles of
law and equity that extend a warranty to or for the 'benefit of a
lessee to other persons. The operation of this section may not be
excluded, modified, or limited, but an exclusion, modification, or
limitation of the warranty, including any with respect to rights and
remedies, effective against the lessee is also effective against any
beneficiary designated under this section.

ALTERNATIVE B
A warranty to or for the benefit of a lessee under this Article,
whether express or implied, extends to any natural person who may
reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods
and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. This section
does not displace principles of law and equity that extend a warranty to or for the benefit of a lessee to other persons. The operation
of this section may not be excluded, modified, or limited, but, an
exclusion, modification, or limitation of the warranty, including any
with respect to rights and remedies, effective against the lessee is
also effective against the beneficiary designated under this section.
215. ALA. CODE § 7-2-318 (1984).
216. Alternative A limits the extension of the warranty to family, household members,
or guests of the lessee. Alternatives B and C extend the warranty to any "person who may
reasonably be expected to use" the goods. In addition, Alternative B states that: "This section does not displace principles of law and equity that extend a warranty to or,for the
benefit of a lessee to other persons." DRAFT' ALA. CoDE § 7-2A-216(2) (1990).
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ALTERNATIVE C
A warranty to or for the benefit of a lessee under this Article,
whether express or implied, extends to any person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods and
who is injured by breach of the warranty. The operation of this section may not be excluded, modified, or limited with respect to injury
to the person of an individual to whom the warranty extends, but an
exclusion, modification, or limitation of the warranty, including any
with respect to rights and remedies, effective against the lessee is
also effective against the beneficiary designated under this
section.217

Compare with that uniform provision, the following Alabama draft:
§ 7-2A-216. THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES OF EXPRESS
AND IMPLIED WARRANTIES.
(1) A warranty to or for the benefit of a lessee under this Article, whether express or implied, extends to any natural person if it is
reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume, or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the
warranty.
(2) This section does not displace principles of law and equity
that extend a warranty to or for the benefit of a lessee to other
persons.
(3) The operation of this section may not be excluded, modified,
or limited, but an exclusion, modification, or limitation of the warranty, including any with respect to rights and remedies, effective
against the lessee is also effective against any person referred to in
subsections (1) and (2) of this section.218

The Alabama draft provision is intended to substantially mirror in substance the analogous Alabama sales law section.
Therefore, the same results should be obtained under both bodies
of law. The differences in the lease formulation should merely clarify the complete and correct reading of the sales law provision.
The Alabama draft differs from the uniform lease provision in
the last clause of what would be Alabama Code section 7-2A216(3). The Alabama adjustment deletes the word "beneficiary"219
and instead inserts for clarification "any person referred to in sub217. U.C.C. § 2A-216 (1990).
218. DRAFT ALA. ConE § 7-2A-216 (1990).
219. U.C.C. § 2A-216 Alternative B (1990).
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sections (1) and (2) of this section."220 This clarification should
make it clear that a disclaimer effective against the lessee would
also be effective against both those persons specifically described
in subsection (1), as well as those parties who would be deemed
beneficiaries by operation of subsection (2).
In Bishop v. Sales, 221 the Al~bama Supreme Court determined
that Alabama Code section 7-2-318, which codified Alternative B
of the Uniform Act, abrogates any vertical privity ~f contract requirement.~22 It is contemplated 'that case law development will
determine wheth~r vertical privity is similarly vitiated in the lease
law by this section. Of course, this provision woUld in no way impair the right of a party who is in privity of contract with the
lessor to bring an action against the lessor notwithstanding the fact
that the plaintiff would not be within the class of third-party beneficiaries· recognized in the section.

G. Alienation of Lessor's and Lessee's Interests·
Secured financing has grown substantially in the course of:the
last th4'ty years, roughly since the promulgation of Article 9 of the
U.C.C. governing security'interests in personal_property. The design of Article 9 has been to provide for the ·grant of a collateral
interest in multifarious property interests, so that the oWners of
those interests may realize the valu~ of such ass~ts. in the more
liquid form of financing proceeds, secured by tho~e assets.
Likewise, a lease of personal property contemplates a division
of property interests between the lessor and lessee. The lessor retains the right to the flow of lease payments as well as a residual
interest in the personalty, and the le~see enjoys th~ right to use the
property. Insofar as either or both parties.to a lease contract may·
be or ~ay choose to become Article 9 debt~rs,223 it is crucial that
220.
221.
222.
223.

DRAFr AL'"' CODE § 7-2A-216(3) (1990).
336 So. 2d 1340 (Ala. 1976).
Bishop, 336 So. 2d at 1345. ·
"Debtor" is defiited as follows:

[T]he person who owes payment or other performance of the. obligation secured,
whether or not he owns or has rights in the collateral, and includes the seller of accounts or chattel paper. Where the debtor and the owner ofthe collateral are not the
same person, the term "debtor" means the owner of the collateral in any provision of
the Article dealing with the collateral, the obligor in any provision dealing .with the
obligation, and may include both where the context so requires ....

u.c.c. § 9-105(1)(d) (1989).
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commercial law determine the rights of the lessee, lessor, and secured creditor of the lessor or of the lessee inter se.
Section 2A-303 of the uniform act formulates rules governing
the alienability of the lessor's and lessee's interests in the lease
property. The original version of section 2A-303 provided that:
§ 2A-303. Alienability of Party's Interest Under Lease Contract or
of Lessor's Residual Interest in Goods; Delegation of Performance;
Assignment of Rights.
(1) Any interest of a party under a lease contract and the lessor's residual interest in the goods may be transferred unless

(a) the transfer is voluntary and the lease contract prohibits the transfer; or
(b) the transfer materially changes the duty of or materially increases the burden or risk imposed on the other
party to the lease contract, and within a reasonable
time after notice of the transfer the other party demands that the transferee comply with subsection (2)
and the transferee fails to comply.
(2) Within a reasonable time after demand pursuant to subsection (l)(b), the transferee shall:
(a) cure or provide adequate assurance that he [or she]
will promptly cure any default other than one arising
from the transfer;
(b) compensate or provide adequate assurance that he
[or she] will promptly compensate the other party to
the lease contract and any other person holding an
interest in the lease contract, except the party whose
interest is being transferred, for any loss to that party
resulting from the transfer;
(c) provide adequate assurance of future due performance under the lease contract; and
(d) assume the lease contract.
(3) Demand pursuant to subsection (l)(b) is without prejudice
to the other party's rights against the transferee and the party
whose interest is transferred.
(4) An assignment of "the lease" or of "all my rights under the
lease" or an assignment in similar general terms is a transfer of
rights, and unless the language or the circumstances, as in an assignment for security, indicate the contrary, the assignment is a
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delegation of duties by the assignor to the assignee and acceptance
by the assignee constitutes a promise by him [or her] to perform
those duties. This promise is enforceable by either the assignor or
the other party to the lease contract.
(5) Unless otherwise agreed by the lessor and the lessee, no delegation of performance relieves the assignor as against the other
party of any duty to perform or any liability for default.
(6) A right to damages for default with respect to the whole
lease contract or a right arising out of the assignor's due performance of his [or her] entire obligation can be assigned despite
agreement otherwise.
(7) To prohibit the transfer of an interest of .a party under a
lease contract, the language of prohibition must be specific, by a
writing, and conspicuous.22"

Professor Steven Harris identified troublesome ambiguities
and uncertainties that might result from the promulgation of that
uniform provision. ~» Rather than burden the commercial finance
industry with what he perceived to be the troublesome priority implied by uniform section 2A-303, he proposed that the grant of
collateral interests in property created by a personal property lease
be excepted from the operation of section 2A-303.226 The promoters of the Cal/Mass Amendments were persuaded by Harris's
analysis and suggested that the provision be modified.227 The 1990
Uniform Amendments follow the Cal/Mass· lead and contain the
revised version of section 2A-303 currently incorporated in the proposed Alabama Act: ·
·
22

§ 7-2A-303. ALIENABILITY OF PARTY'S INTEREST UNDER
LEASE CONTRACT OR OF LESSOR'S RESIDUAL INTEREST
IN GOODS; DELEGATION OF PERFORMANCE; TRANSFER
OF RIGHTS.
(1) As used in this section, "creation of a security interest" includes the sale of a lease contract that is .subject to Article 9,
Secured Transactions, by reason of Section 7-9-102(1)(b).
(2) Except as ·provided in subsections (3) and (4), a provision in
a lease agreement which (i) prohibits the voluntary or involuntary
transfer, including a transfer by sale, sublease, creation or enforcement of a security· interest, or attachment, levy,' or other judicial

u.c.c.

224.
§ 2A-303 (1989).
225. Harris, The Rights of Creditors Under Article 2A, 39 ALA. L. REv. 803 (1988).
226. Id. at 844-45.
227. CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 186, at 1011-14.
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process, of an interest of a party under the lease contract or of the
lessor's residual interest in the goods, or (ii) makes such a transfer
an event of default, gives rise to the rights and remedies provided in
subsection (5), but a transfer that is prohibited or is an event of
default under the lease agreement is otherwise effective.
(3) (a) A provision in a lease agreement which (i) prohibits the
creation or enforcement of a security interest in an interest of a
party under the lease contract or in the lessor's residual interest in
the goods, or (ii) makes such a transfer an event of default, is not
enforceable unless, and then only to the extent that, there is an actual transfer by the lessee of the lessee's right of possession or use of
the goods in violation of the provision or an actual delegation of a
material performance of either party to the lease contract in violation of the provision. (b) Neither the granting nor the enforcement
of a security interest in (i) the lessor's interest under the lease contract or (ii) the lessor's residual interest in the goods is a transfer
that materially impairs the prospect of obtaining return performance by, materially changes the duty of, or materially increases the
burden or risk imposed on, the lessee within the purview of subsection (5) unless, and then only to the extent that, there is an actual
delegation of a material performance of the lessor.
(4) A provision in a lease agreement which (i) prohibits a transfer of a right to damages for default with respect to the whole lease
contract or of a right to payment arising out of the transferor's due
performance of the transferor's entire obligation, or (ii) makes such
a transfer an event of default, is not enforceable, and such a transfer
is not a transfer that materially impairs the prospect of obtaining
return performance by, materially changes the·duty of, or materially
increases the burden or risk imposed on, the other party to the lease
contract within the purview of subsection (5).
(5) Subject to subsections (3) and (4):
(a) if a transfer is made which is made an event of default under a lease agreement, the party to the lease
contract not making the transfer, unless that party
waives the default or otherwise agrees, has the rights
and remedies described in Section 7-2A-501(2);
(b) if paragraph (a) is not applicable and if a transfer is
made that (i) is prohibited under a lease agreement
or (ii) materially impairs the prospect of obtaining return performance by, materially changes the duty of,
or materially increases the burden or risk imposed on,
the other party to the lease contract, unless the party
not making the transfer agrees at any time to the
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transfer in the lease contract or otherwise, then, except as limited by contract, (i) the transferor is liable
to the party not making the transfer for damages
caused by the transfer to the extent that the damages
could not reasonably be prevented by the party not
making the transfer and (ii) a court having jurisdiction may grant other appropriate relief, including
cancellation of the lease contract or an injunction
against the transfer.
(6) A transfer of "the lease" or of "all my rights under the
lease", or.a transfer in similar general terms, is a transfer of rights
and, unless the language or the circumstances, as in a transfer for
security, indicate the contrary, the transfer is a delegation of duties
by the transferor to the transferee. Acceptance by the transferee
constitutes a promise by the transferee to perform those duties. The
promise is enforceable by either the transferor or t~e other party to
the lease contract.
(7) Unless otherwise agreed by the lessor and the lessee, a delegation of performance does not relieve the transferor as against the
other party of any duty to perform or of any liability for default.
(8) In a consumer lease, to prohibit the transfer of an interest of
a party under the lease contract 9r to make a transfer an event of
default, the language must be specific, by a writing, and
conspicuous.228

The current draft of Alabama Article 2A incorporates the 1990
Uniform Amendments in order to facilitate the hypothecation of
valuable interests in secured financing. Under subsection (2), a
transfer prohibited by the lease gives rise to the remedies of subsection (5), but is otherwise effective. In other words, even though
the transfer was contractually prohibited, the unauthorized transfer is not automatically void. 229 In addition, the default remedy
228. DRAFT ALA. ConE§ 7-2A-303 (1990) (adopting verbatim U.C.C. § 2A-303 (1990)).
229. U.C.C. § 2A-303 comment 1 (1990) provides as follows:
[Transfers] are effective, notwithstanding a provision in the lease agreement prohibiting the transfer or making the transfer an event_of default. Although the transfers are
effective, the provision in the lease agreement is nevertheless enforceable, but only as
provided in subsection (5) which limits the prejudiced party to remedies for default
under this Article if the transfer has been made an event of default, or damages if the
transfer is prohibited.
Id. See also U.C.C. § 9-311 (1989) (voluntary and involuntary transfers of an interest).
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under subsection (5)(b) is limited to actual damages which could
not have been mitigated by the nontransferor.230
Under subsection (3), a lease provision prohibiting the transfer
of a security interest is not enforceable unless there is an actual
transfer that "involves an actual delegation of a material performance of the lessor" in violation of the lease.231 Thus, according to
comment 4,232 granting a security interest, by itself, does not trigger a right to a remedy; there must be a transfer and the
delegation of a material performance owed to the non-transferring
party under the lease contract. As comments 2 and 7 make clear,
materiality is judged by the existence of a further duty under the
lease that the transferring party owes to the nontransferring
party. 233 Comment 7234 indicates that the distinction between operating leases and nonoperating leases would aid In the
understanding of the subsection. ~
23

H.

Liquidation of Damages

The rule was established in Alabama before the promulgation
of the U.C.C. that a liquidated damages provision in a contract
would not be enforced to the extent that it represented a penalty
rather than the parties' good faith effort to allocate risks attending
the default of one or the other of the parties to the contract. 236 In
fact, it has been held in this state in a case decided after the enactment of Article 2 that the voidability of a liquidated damages
provision as a penalty is to be determined as a matter of law by the
230. U.C.C. § 2A-303(5)(b)(ii) (1990). Of course, this statement is true if the transfer is
prohibited. If the transfer is an event of default under the lease agreement, then under
subsection (5)(a) the non-transferor is entitled to lease remedies and/or the remedies
granted under section 7-2A-501(2).
231. Id. § 2A-303 & comment 4.
232. Id.
233. Id. comments 2 & 7.
234. Id. comment 7. As an aside, comment 7 actually refers to subsection (4) rather
than subsection (3), but the wording and substance of these subsections are quite similar
such that the comment is relevant to each subsection.
235. U.C.C. § 2A-303 comment 7 (1990) ("Although the distinction may be difficult to
draw in some cases, it is instructive to focus on the differences between 'operating' and 'nonoperating' leases as generally understood in the marketplace.").
236. See Pasquale Food Co. v. L & H Int'l Airmotive, 51 Ala. App. 127, 136, 283 So. 2d
438, 446, cert. denied, 291 Ala. 795, 283 So. 2d 448 (1973).
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court, rather than as a matter of fact.237 Section 2A-504, of both
the uniform version238 and the Alabama draft,239 provides the
following:
§ 2A-504. Liquidation of Damages.
(1) Damages payable by either party for default, or any other
act or omission, including indemnity for loss or diminution of anticipated tax benefits or loss or damage to lessor's residual interest, may
be liquidated in the leas~ agreement but only at an amount or by a
formula that is reasonable in light of the then anticipated harm
caused by the default or other act or omission.
(2) If the lease agreement provides for liquidation of damages,
and such provision does not comply with subsection (1), or such provision is an exclusive or limited remedy that circumstances cause to
fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this
Article.
(3) If the lessor justifiably withholds or stops delivery of goods
because of the lessee's default or insolvency (Section 2A-525 or 2A526), the lessee is entitled to restitution of any amount by which the
sum of his [or her] payments exceeds:

(a) the amount to which the lessor is entitled by virtue of
terms liquidating the lessor's damages in accordance
with subsection (1); or
(b) in the absence of those terms, 20 percent of the then
present value of the total r~nt the lessee was obligated to pay for the balance of the lease term, or, in
the case of a consumer lease, the lesser of sue~
amount or $500.
(4) A lessee's right to restitution under subsection (3) is subject
to offset to the extent the lessor establishes:
(a) a right to recover damages under the provisions of
this Article other than subsection (1); and
(b) the amount or value of any benefits received by the
lessee directly or indirectly by reason of the lease
contract.240
237.
provision
238.
239.
240.

Pasquale, 51 Ala. App. at 137, 283 So. 2d at 447 (holding that liquidated damages
was not unreasonable, and therefore not void as a penalty).
U.C.C. § 2A-504 (1990).
DRAFT ALA. CODE § 7-2A-504 (1990).
U.C.C. § 2A-504 (1990); see also DRAFT ALA. CoDE § 7-2A-504 (1990).
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Although the statute itself has not caused the Committee considerable trouble, there is some concern about the official comment
promulgated by the A.L.I. and N.C.C.U.S.L. That comment explains, in pertinent part, that the provision in the Article 2
analogue241 "providing that a term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty, was ... not incorporated."242
While that would seem to suggest that an unreasonably large liquidated damages amount would not be voidable as a penalty, the
comment further explains that "[b ]y deleting the reference to unreasonably large liquidated damages the parties are free to
negotiate a formula, restrained by the rule of reasonableness in
this section."248 The design is of course to encourage the parties'
incorporation of liquidated damages provisions, unburdened by the
concern that a court will, post hoc, void the liquidated damages
figure as a penalty. The drafters note that insofar as the liquidated
damages provision would often contemplate reimbursement of the
lessor for tax loss, it would not be unusual for the liquidated damages amount to exceed, perhaps by many times, the value of the
lease property. 244
The Alabama Committee has expressed some concern with the
inference that might be drawn from the deletion of the provision
from the Sales analogue that an unreasonably large liquidated
damages figure would be void as a penalty. Instead, it would seem
that if tax laws could result in losses that exceed substantially the
value of the lease property, there is in fact nothing unreasonable
about a liquidated damages clause that would provide for recovery
of such tax losses. That construction of the uniform statute and
commentary may be preferable to a reading that would suggest
that a venerable contract principle in this state, the voidability of
unreasonable liquidated damages, would be abrogated by adoption
of uniform section 2A-504.
241. U.C.C. § 2-718 (1989). In particular, section 2-718(1) provides that damages may
be liquidated "at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual
harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy." ld. § 2-718(1).
242. U.C.C. § 2A-504 comment (1990).
243. Id.
244. Id.
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Consumer Issues

Professor Fred Miller, a member of the Permanent Editorial.
Board of the Uniform Commercial. Code and a drafter of uniform
Article 2A, wrote an article in the Alabama Law Review Article 2A
Symposium concerning the Uniform Act's treatment of recurring
consumer issues. 2415 In light of Professor Miller's observations, the
sponsors of the Cal/Mass Amendment package evidently felt that
it was necessary to provide consumers more protection than was
offered by the uniform version of the act. While it is not feasible to
survey all the consumer provisions in the uniform and Cal/Mass
versions, there is one section in particular that has generated considerable discussion among the · members of the Alabama
Committee. Reproduced below are the provisions of uniform section 2A-516 and the Cal/Mass counterpart:
Uniform provision§ 2A-516. Effect- of Acceptance of Goods; Notice of Default; Burden

of Establishing Default After Acceptance; Notice of Claim or Litigation to Person Answerable Over.
(1) A lessee must pay rent for any goods accepted in accordance
with the lease contract, with due allowance for goods rightfully rejected or not delivered.
(2) A lessee's acceptance of goods precludes rejection of the
goods accepted. In the case of a finance lease, if made with knowl. edge of a nonconformity, acceptance cannot be revoked because of
.it. In any other case, if made with knowledge of a nonconformity,
acceptance cannot be revoked because of it unless the acceptance
'was on the reasonable assumption that the nonconformity would be
seasonably cured. Acceptance does not of itself impair any other
remedy provided by this Article or the lease agreement for
· nonconformity.
(3) If a tender has been accepted:
(a) within a reasonable time· after the lessee discovers or
should have discovered any default, the lessee shall
notify the lessor and the supplier, or be barred from
any remedy;
(b) except in the case of a consumer lease, within a reasonable time after the lessee receives notice of
litigation for infringement or the like (Section 2A245. Miller, Consumer Leases Under Uniform Commercial Code Article 2A, 39 ALA.
L. REv. 957 (1988).
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211) the lessee shall notify the lessor or be barred
from any remedy over for liability established by the
litigation; and
the burden is on the lessee to establish any default.

(4) If a lessee is sued for breach of a warranty or other obligation for which a lessor or a supplier is answerable over:
(a) The lessee may give the lessor or the supplier written
notice of the litigation. If the notice states that the
lessor or the supplier may come in and defend and
that if the lessor or the supplier does not do so he [or
she] will be bound in any action against him [or her]
by the lessee by any determination of fact common to
the two litigations, then unless the lessor or the supplier after seasonable receipt of the notice does come
in and defend he [or she] is so bound.
(b) The lessor or the supplier may demand in writing
that the lessee turn over control of the litigation including settlement if the claim is one for
infringement or the like (Section 2A-211) or else be
barred from any remedy over. If the demand states
that the lessor or the supplier agrees to bear all expense and to satisfy any adverse judgment, then
unless the lessee after seasonable receipt of the demand does turn over control the lessee is so barred.
(5) The provisions of subsections (3) and (4) apply to any obligation of a lessee to hold the lessor or the supplier harmless against
infringement or the like (Section 2A-211).246

Cal/Mass Amendment and Alabama proposal§ 7-2A-516. EFFECT OF ACCEPTANCE OF GOODS; NOTICE OF

DEFAULT; BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING DEFAULT AFTER
ACCEPTANCE; NOTICE OF CLAIM OR LITIGATION TO PERSON ANSWERABLE OVER.
(1) A lessee must pay rent for any goods accepted in accordance
with the lease contract, with due allowance for goods rightfully rejected or not delivered.
(2) A lessee's acceptance of goods precludes rejection of the
goods accepted. In the case of a finance lease, other than a consumer
lease in which the supplier assisted in the preparation of the lease
contract or participated in negotiating the terms of the lease con246. U.C.C. § 2A-516 (1989).
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tract with the lessor, if made with knowledge of a nonconformity,.
acceptance cannot be revoked because of it. In any other case, if
made with knowledge of a nonconformity, acceptance cannot be revoked because of it unless the acceptance was on the reasonable
assumption that the nonconformity would be seasonably cured. Acceptance does not of itself impair any other remedy provided by this
Article or the lease agreement for nonconformity.
(3) If a tender has been accepted:
'

(a) within a reasonable time after the lessee discovers or
should have dis~overed. any. default, the lessee shall
notify the lessor and the supplier, if any, or be barred.
from any remedy against the party not notified;
(b) within a reasonable time after- the lessee receives no. tice of litigation for infringement or the like (Section
7-2A-211) -the lessee shall notify the lessor or be
barred from any remedy over for liability established
by the litigation; and
(c) the burden is on the lessee to establish any default.
(4) If a lessee is sued fo! breach of a warranty or other obligation for which a lessor or a supplier is answerable over the following
apply:
(a) The lessee may give the lessor or the supplier, or
both, written notice of the litigation. If the notice
states that the person notified may come in and defend and that if the person notified .does not do so
that person will be bourid in any action against that
person by the lesse.e by any determination of fact
common to the two litigations, then unless the person
notified after seasonable receipt of the notice does
come in and defend that ·person is so bound.
(b) The lessor or the supplier may demand in -writing
that the lessee turn over control of the litigation including settlement if the claim is one for
infringement or the like (Section 7-2A-211) or else be
barred from any remedy over. If the demand states
that the lessor or the supplier agrees to bear all expense and to satisfy any adverse judgment, then
unless the lessee after seasonable receipt of the demand does turn over control the lessee is so barred.
(5) Subsections (3) and (4) apply to any obligation
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of a lessee to hold the lessor or the supplier harmless against infringement or the like (Section 7-2A-211).247
(6) Subsection (3) shall not apply to a consumer lease.

The sponsors of the Cal/Mass Amendments have not explained their reasons for modifying the right of a consumer lessee
to revoke acceptance of goods in the case of a finance lease.248 The
inference may be reasonably drawn, however, that the design is to
give effect to consumer expectations that the typical consumer finance lease is akin to a sale. When a consumer goes to a Chevrolet
dealership to buy a Camaro, she may decide instead to lease the
car, not because the consumer is aware of the different allocation
of rights and liabilities in a lease (as contrasted with a sale), but
because the monthly lease payments are within her means while
the purchase payments are not. Furthermore, in the consumer finance lease setting, the Cal/Mass Amendment seems to recognize
the operation of commercial principles that led to the informed development of the "close-connectedness" doctrine in commercial
paper law.249 Under the Cal/Mass Amendments, the consumer finance lessee would not however have an absolute right to revoke
vis-a-vis the financer. The right of revocation would only arise "if
the supplier assisted in the preparation of the lease contract or
participated in the negotiation of the lease contract terms with the
lessor,"2110 a prototypical close-connectedness situation. 2111
247. DRAFT ALA. ConE§ 7-2A-516 (1990). The 1990 Article 2A Uniform Amendments
have adopted the above Cal/Mass Amendments verbatim. See U.C.C. § 2A-516 (1990).
248. CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 186, at 1035; see DRAFT ALA. ConE§ 7-2A-516(2)
(1990).
249. Arcanum Nat'l Bank v. Hessler, 69 Ohio St. 2d 549, 433 N.E.2d 204 (1982);
Slaughter v. Jefferson Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 538 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Kaw Valley
State Bank & Trust Co. v. Riddle, 219 Kan. 550, 549 P.2d 927 (1976); Waterbury Sav. Bank
v. Jaroszewski, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 620, 238 A.2d 446 (1967); Milwaukee Acceptance Corp. v.
Dore, 43 Wis. 2d 412, 168 N.W.2d 594 (1969); see also Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase
Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L.
REV. 605 (1981).
250. DRAFT ALA. ConE§ 7-2A-516 Alabama comment (1990).
251. See Arcanum Nat'l Bank v. Hessler, 69 Ohio St. 2d 549, 433 N.E.2d 204, 210
(1982) (citing J. WHITE & R. SuMMERS, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL ConE § 14-8, at 481 (2d ed.
1972)). Professors White and Summers list five factors which are indicative of a close connection between the lender and the seller:
(1) the lender drafting forms for the seller;
(2) the lender approving and/or establishing the seller's procedures;
(3) the lender making an independent check on the debtor's credit or some
other direct contact between the lender and the debtor;
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The justification for the previous uniform version focuses on
the fact that the financing lessor is really in no position to police
the fitness of the goods. Any enhanced right to revoke a consumer
lease may therefore have a chilling effect on the financing of consumer leases-clearly a result inconsistent with the best interests
of consumers and financers alike. This tension, of course, has at- ·
tended the promulgation of 'all consumer legislation.2152 For these
reasons, the Alabama Committee decided to follow the Cal/Mass
version, rather than the old uniform formulation.
J.

Lessor's Action for Rent and the Duty to -Mitigate

The default provisions of Uniform Article 2A that would supplement a lessor's common law remedies, for the most part, track
parallel provisions in the Sales analogue.2158 Given fundamental differences between the ~ocation of property rights in sales and
leases, however, there are necessarily some differences in the formulation of the default prQvisions of the two ~ticles. These
sections have been carefully consid~red by the Alabama Law Review Article 2A Symposi~ commen~ators. 21515 In particular, section
2154

(4) the seller's heavy reliance on the lender; and
(5) common or connected ownership or management of the seller and lender.
J. WHITE & R. SuMMERS, supra § 14-8, at 481.
252. McKenzie, The Cost of Protection, L.A. Daily J., March 31, 1982, at 4, col. 3
("Once we have recognized the potential cost of increased product safety[,] the problems of
whether products should be made safer [are] no longer simple. Not all consumers demand
the same of safety, given the price...• Diversity, not uniformity, is the hallmark of society,
and an economic system that serves society must reflect this.").
253. Compare U.C.C. § 2A-523 (1990) with U.C.C. § 2-703 (1989) (these sections list
available remedies in the event of lessee or buyer default, respectively). More specifically,
subsections (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of section 2-703 correspond generally to subsections
(c), (d), (b), (e), (e) and (a) of section 2A-523, respectively.
254. Compare U.C.C. § 2A-527(5) (1990) ("lessor is not accountable to the lessee for
any profit made on any disposition" in an event of lessee default) and id. § 2A-529(2)-(3)
("lessor shall hold [identified goods] for the lessee during remaining lease term" unless the
lessor elects to dispose of such goods) (emphasis added) with U.C.C. § 2-706(6) (1989). Although section 2-706(6) provides that "[t}he seller is not accountable to the [defaulting]
buyer for any profit made on any resale," it makes clear that "[a] person in the position of a
seller (Section 2-707) or a buyer who has rightfully rejected or justifiably revoked acceptance must account for any excess over the amount of his security interest." Id.
255. See, e.g., Benfield, Lessor's Damages Under Ar.ticle 2A After Default by the
Lessee As to Accepted Goods, 39 ALA. L. R~v. 915 (1988); Rapson, Deficiencies and Ambiguities in Lessors' Remedies Under Article 2A: Using Official Comments to Cure Problems in
the Statute, 39 ALA. L. REv. 875 (1988).
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2A-529, concerning the lessor's action for rent upon the lessee's default, has generated considerable discussion during the Alabama
Committee's deliberations.
Compare the original uniform version of this provision,
§ 2A-529. Lessor's Action for the Rent.

(1) After default by the lessee under the lease contract (Section
2A-523(1)), if the lessor complies with subsection (2), the lessor may
recover from the lessee as damages:
(a) for goods accepted by the lessee and for conforming
goods lost or damaged within a commercially reasonable time after risk of loss passes to the lessee (Section
2A-219), (i) accrued and unpaid rent as of the date of
default, (ii) the present value as of the date of default
of the rent for the remaining lease term of the lease
agreement, and (iii) any incidental damages allowed
under Section 2A-530, less expenses saved in consequence of the lessee's default; and
(b) for goods identified to the lease contract if the lessor
is unable after reasonable effort to dispose of them at
a reasonable price or the circumstances reasonably
indicate that effort will be unavailing, (i) accrued and
unpaid rent as of the date of default, (ii) the present
value as of the date of default of the rent for the remaining lease term of the lease agreement, and (iii)
any incidental damages allowed under Section 2A530, less expenses saved in consequence of the
lessee's default.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (3), the lessor shall hold
for the lessee for the remaining lease term of the lease agreement
any goods that have been identified to the lease contract and are in
the lessor's control.
(3) The lessor may dispose of the goods at any time before collection of the judgment for damages obtained pursuant to
subsection (1). If the disposition is before the end of the remaining
lease term of the lease agreement, the lessor's recovery against the
lessee for damages will be governed by Section 2A-527 or Section
2A-528.
(4) Payment of the judgment for damages obtained pursuant to
subsection (1) entitles the lessee to use and possession of the goods
not then disposed of for the remaining lease term of the lease
agreement.
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(5) After a lessee has wrongfully rejected ,or revoked acceptance
of goods, has failed to pay rent then due, or has repudiated (Section
2A-402), a lessor who is held not entitled to rent under this section
must nevertheless be awarded damages for non-acceptance under
Sections 2A-527 and 2A-528.258

with the 1990 Uniform Amendment version, adopting the Cal/
Mass Amendment, and incorporated into the Alabama Draft:
§ 2A-529. LESSOR'S ACTION FOR THE RENT.

(1) Mter default by the lessee under the lease contract of the
type described in Section 2A-523(1), or 2A-523(3)(a) or, if agreed,
after other default by the lessee, if the lessor complies with subsection (2), the lessor may recover from the lessee as damages:
(a) for goods accepted by the lessee and not repossessed
by or tendered to the ~essor, and for conforming
goods lost or damaged within a commercially reasonable time after risk of loss passes to the lessee (Section
2A-219), (i) accrued and unpaid rent as of the date of
entry of judgment in favor of the lessor, (ii) the present value as _of the same date of the rent for the then
remaining lease term of the lease agreement, and (iii)
any incidental damages allowed under Section 2A530, less expenses saved in consequence of the lessee's
default; and
(b) for goods identified to the lease contract if the lessor
is unable after reasonable effort to dispose of them at
a reasonable price or the circumstances reasonably
indicate that effort will be unavailing, (i) accrued and
unpaid rent as of the date of entry of judgment in
favor of the lessor, (ii) the present value as of the
same date of the rent for the then remaining lease
term of the lease agreement, and (iii) any incidental
damages allowed under Section 2A-530, less expenses
saved in consequence of the lessee's default.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (3), the lessor shall hold
for the lessee for the remaining lease term of the lease agreement
any goods that have been identified to the lease contract and are in
the lessor's control.
(3) The lessor may dispose of the goods at any time before collection of the judgment for damages obtained pursuant to
256. U;C.C. § 2A-529 (1989).
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subsection (1). If the disposition is before the end of the remaining
lease term of the lease agreement, the lessor's recovery against the
lessee for damages is governed by Section 2A-527 or Section 2A-528,
and the lessor will cause an appropriate credit to be provided
against any judgment for damages to the extent that the amount of
the judgment exceeds the recovery available pursuant to Section 2A527 or 2A-528.
(4) Payment of the judgment for damages obtained pursuant to
subsection (1) entitles the lessee to the use and possession of the
goods not then disposed of for the remaining lease term of and in
accordance with the lease agreement.
(5) After a lessee has wrongfully rejected or revoked acceptance
of goods, has failed to pay rent then due, or has repudiated (Section
2A-402), a lessor who is held not entitled to rent under this section
must nevertheless be awarded damages for non-acceptance under
Sections 2A-527 and 2A-528.267

Perhaps the most notable contrast between the two versions is
that the Uniform Amendment imposes upon the lessor a broader
duty to mitigate2 8 his damages against the lessee in certain limited
circumstances.2 9 The original uniform version limited the lessor's
duty to mitigate to a more limited situation;260 the lessor could
have therefore simply recovered the lease property and held it for
the remainder of the lease term, apparently without any obligation
to relet the property for the lessee's account. 261 The reason for the
original Uniform Act's seemingly flagrant departure from common
law and statutory principles of mitigation was based on the nature
of the lessor's and lessee's interests in leased property. Arguably,
the lessor is the owner of the leased property and should not be
required, or even encouraged by personal property lease law, to
compromise that absolute ownership interest. Accordingly, this position holds that Article 2A should not mandate that such goods be
relet. Given that view of the lessor's ownership interest, the anall)

1')

257. u.c.c. § 2A-529 (1990); DRAFT ALA. CODE § 7-2A-529 (1990).
258. U.C.C. § 2A-529(1)(b) (1990).
259. Id. § 2A-529(1)(b) (duty to mitigate arises as to undelivered, identified goods,
repossessed goods, and goods that have been tendered back by the lessee).
260. U.C.C. § 2A-529(1)(b) & comment (1989) (duty to mitigate arises only "with respect to goods identified to the lease contract (but not accepted by the lessee-see
subparagraph (l)(a)) ....").
261. U.C.C. § 2A-529 (1989); accord Rapson, Deficiencies and Ambiguities in Lessors'
Remedies Under Article 2A: Using Official Comments to Cure Problems in the Statute, 39
ALA. L. REV. 875, 887 (1988).
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ogy to, and imposition by, sales law of a duty upon a seller to resell
the goods after a buyer's breach262 is simply inapposite.
Professor Marion Benfield championed forcefully the position
taken by the Cal/Mass Amendments and now adopted by the 1990
Uniform Amendments;263 in fact, his article in.. the Alabama Law
Review Article 2A Symposium occasioned these ame~dments.264
The current formulation requires only that the lessor make "a reasonable effort to dispose of'' the goods. 2615 The penalty for the
lessor's failure to act in that reasonable manner is denial of damages as described in subsection (l)(b).266,

K. Protection of Lessor's Residual Interest
Perhaps not unrelated to the issues presented in the preceding
section regarding damages is the issue of the lessee's duty to protect the lessor's residual interest267 in the leased goods. It is, after
all, the lessor's residual interest that is at risk when the lessor is
required to mitigate by selling or reletting the lease property.
There was originally no uniform provision that specifically formulated a lessee's duty to protect the lessor's residual interest, nor
was there a provision that provided that the lessee's compromise of
the lessor's residual interest would constitute an event of default,
absent such provision in the lease agreement. It is, of course, true
that carefully drafted lease agreements should provide just such a
lessee duty and event of default. 268
262. Compare U.C.C. § 2-706 (1989) with id. § 2-708.
_
263. Benfield, Lessor's Damages Under Article 2A After Default by the Lessee As to
Accepted Goods, 39 ALA. L. REv. 915, 921 (1988).
264. Letter from Donald J. Rapson to James S. Roberts, Coordinator, Alabama Law
Review Article 2A Symposium (Aug. 13, 1987) (discussing protection of lessor's right regarding residual interest).
265. U.C.C. § 2A-529(1)(b) (1990).
266. Id. comment 1 ("Absent a lease contract provision to the contrary, an action for
the full unpaid rent (discounted to present value as of the time of entry of judgment as to
rent due after that time) is unavailable as to goods not lost or damaged only if the lessee
retains possession of the goods or the lessor is or apparently will be unable to dispose of
them at a reasonable price after a reasonable effort!' (emphasis added)).
267. Id. § 2A-529 comment 1 ("In a lease, the lessor always has a residual interest in
the goods which the lessor usually realizes upon at the end of a lease term by either sale or a
new lease.").
268. See 2 P. ALcES, N. HANSFORD, P. LACY & R ANziVINo, supra note 175, §
11:22(14)(d) (lessee's assignment to creditors constitute default).
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The California draft of the version of Article 2A incorporates a
provision concerning the lessor's residual interest, and that provision has now been incorporated into the 1990 Uniform
Amendments, as well as by the Alabama Committee:
§ 2A-532. LESSOR'S RIGHTS TO RESIDUAL INTEREST

In addition to any other recovery permitted by this Article or
other law, the lessor may recover from the lessee an amount that
will fully compensate the lessor for any loss of or damage to the
lessor's residual interest in the goods caused by the default of the
lessee. 269

IV.

CoNCLUSION

This Article has endeavored to familiarize the Alabama commercial bar with the current contours of personal property lease
law in this state, and to acquaint the practitioner with the progress
of the Alabama Article 2A Committee's deliberations. It has described the sources of the status quo, and has suggested the need
for comprehensive codification in this area of the commercial law.
The authors hope that progress on this project will continue
apace and culminate, in the not-too-distant future, in the type of
coherent personal property lease law that will serve the interests of
all Alabama constituencies. Further, by striking the appropriate
balance between the needs of this state and the systemic goals of
uniformity, enactment of an Alabama version of Article 2A will enhance the practice of commercial law in Alabama and thereby
encourage national, as well as international, interests to enter into
lease transactions governed by the new Alabama statute.

269. U.C.C. § 2A-532 (1990); DRAFT ALA. CoDE§ 7-2A-532 (1990); CAL. CoM. CoDE ANN.
§ 10532 (West 1990); see also CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 186, at 1045-46.

